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imbalanced, as is the case in many extant discrimination problems. We consider two affirmative-
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1 Introduction
Statistical discrimination refers to discrimination against minority people, taken by fully rational
and non-prejudiced agents.1 In contrast to taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), which regards
agents’ preferences (e.g., racism, sexism) as the primary source of discrimination, the model of
statistical discrimination does not assume preferences of hating discriminated groups. Previous
studies have shown that even in the absence of prejudice, discrimination could occur persistently
because of various reasons, such as the discouragement of human capital investment (Arrow, 1973;
Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and Norman, 2004), information friction (Phelps, 1972; Cornell and
Welch, 1996), and search friction (Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked, 2000). The literature has
proposed a variety of affirmative-action policies to solve statistical discrimination, and many of
them are being implemented in practice.
The contribution of this paper is to articulate a new channel of statistical discrimination—
underestimation of minority workers that appears as a consequence of social learning. Most of
the extant literature focuses on behaviors of rational agents under an equilibrium where agents
have a correct belief about the relationship between observable characteristics and unobservable
skills. However, several empirical studies have shown that real-world people often have a biased
belief towards minority groups.2 The aim of this study is to endogenize the evolution of the biased
belief and analyze its consequence. In our model, (i) all firms (decision makers) are fully rational
and non-prejudiced (i.e., attempt to hire the most productive worker), and (ii) all workers are ex
ante symmetric. We show that, even in such an environment, a biased belief could be generated
endogenously and persist in the long run.
For instruction, we use the terminology of hiring markets (while our model is applicable to
1According to Moro’s (2009) definition,
Statistical discrimination is a theory of inequality between demographic groups based on stereotypes
that do not arise from prejudice or racial and gender bias.
Although some previous studies in statistical discrimination consider the consequence of exogenously endowed bi-
ased beliefs (e.g., Bohren, Haggag, Imas, and Pope, 2019a; Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg, 2019b; Monachou and
Ashlagi, 2019), we additionally require that agents are fully rational.
2De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo (2010) analyzed an Italian local administration record where a gender quota
is introduced in a short period of 1993-1995, which resulted in increased representation of women politicians even
after the quota is terminated. Battaglini, Harris, and Patacchini (2020) showed that increased professional exposure
of women judges promotes hiring of other women judges and hypothesized that it is due to the reinforced belief of
women’s professional capabilities. Bohren et al. (2019a) showed that there is a widespread misconception on the
mathematical competence of American people.
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a broader class of situations). In our model, firms make hiring decisions based on observable
characteristics, sequentially.3 However, the true statistical relationship between characteristics and
actual skills is not observed directly; thus, firms need to learn it based on the data about past hiring
cases. Firms tend to have insufficient data about minority groups because (i) minority groups are
literally a “minority” (in terms of the population), and (ii) they have been discriminated against
and not hired in history. The lack of data makes it difficult to assess the skills of minority workers.
Hence, it tends to be safer and more profitable to hire a majority candidate, whose skill is accurately
estimable. This situation persists because no firm is willing to “experiment” with hiring minorities.
Consequently, minority workers may never be hired, and firms may miss many skillful workers from
the minority group. We also show that some temporary affirmative-action policies can effectively
prevent this form of discrimination.
We develop a multi-armed bandit model of social learning, in which many myopic and short-lived
firms sequentially make hiring decisions. In each round, a firm faces multiple candidate workers.
Each firm wants to hire only one person. Each firm’s utility is determined by the hired worker’s
skill, which cannot be observed directly until employment. However, as in the standard statistical
discrimination model, each worker also has an observable characteristic that is associated with the
worker’s hidden skill. In the beginning, no one knows the precise way to interpret the the worker’s
observable characteristic for predicting that skill. Hence, firms first need to learn the relationship
between the characteristic and skill, and then apply the statistical model to evaluate the predicted
skill of workers. We assume that, firms submit all the information about their hiring cases to a
public database, and therefore, each firm can observe all the past hiring cases (the characteristics
and skills of all the workers actually hired in the past).
Each worker belongs to a group that represents the worker’s gender, race, and ethnicity. We
assume that the characteristics of workers who belong to different groups should be interpreted
differently. This assumption is realistic. First, previous studies have revealed that the underrepre-
sented groups receive unfairly low evaluations in many places.4 When the observable characteristic
3Observable characteristics can be very informative in one’s career. Wang, Zhang, Posse, and Bhasin (2013)
showed that the CV is very informative for predicting whether a software engineer switches another senior position
in three years.
4For example, Trix and Psenka (2003) study letters of recommendation for medical faculty and find that letters
written for female applicants differ systematically from those written for male applicants. Hanna and Linden (2012)
suggest that students who belong to lower caste (in India) tend receive unfairly lower exam scores. Conversely, as for
teaching evaluation, MacNell, Driscoll, and Hunt (2015) and Mitchell and Martin (2018) demonstrate that students
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is an evaluation provided by an outside rater, then the characteristic information itself could be
biased because of the prejudice of the rater. Second, evaluations may also reflect differences in the
culture, living environment, and social system. For example, firms must be familiar with the custom
of writing recommendation letters to interpret letters correctly.5 Hence, the observable character-
istics (curriculum vitae, exam score, grading report, recommendation letter, teaching evaluation,
etc.) may provide very different implications even when their appearances are similar. If firms are
impartial and aware of these biases, they should adjust the way they interpret the characteristics,
by applying different statistical models for different groups.6
Firms are typically less knowledgeable about minority workers. In many cases, discriminated
groups are literally “minorities,” and therefore, the number of candidate workers itself tends to be
smaller. Furthermore, even when discriminated groups are demographically a majority, they might
not have been hired in the past due to a historical reason. Hence, compared with majority workers,
the data about minority workers are often insufficient.
The lack of data results in inaccurate prediction of minority workers’ skills, and the inaccuracy
discourages firms from hiring the minorities. Many workers apply for each job opening. To get
hired, a worker must have the highest predicted skill. Once the minority group is underestimated,
it is difficult for a minority worker to appear to be the best candidate worker—even if the true
skill is the highest, the firm will not be convinced. Underestimation rarely happens once society
acquires a sufficiently rich data set. However, in an early stage of the game, the minority group is
underestimated due to bad realizations of the unpredictable component.
The structure described above causes perpetual underestimation. Firms tend to hire majority
workers because of the imbalance of data richness. However, as long as firms only hire majority
workers, society cannot learn about the minority group; thus, the imbalance remains even in the
long run. Here, the minority group is perpetually underestimated: the lack of data prevents hiring,
and therefore, minority workers are never hired. We prove that, perpetual underestimation may
rated the male identity significantly higher than the female identity. Hanna´k, Wagner, Garcia, Mislove, Strohmaier,
and Wilson (2017) study online freelance marketplaces and find that gender and race are significantly correlated with
worker evaluations.
5Precht (1998) and Al-Ali (2004) report cross-cultural differences in letters of recommendations (that do not
originate from discrimination).
6Through a randomized experiment, Williams and Ceci (2015) demonstrate that as for the STEM tenure track
hiring, female applicants are favored over male applicants. This result is consistent with our assumption here: If the
observed characteristics are systematically biased, an impartial employer would debias the data before interpreting
it. This may lead to reversal discrimination.
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happen with a significantly large probability in our model. Importantly, perpetual underestimation
becomes more frequent when the population ratio is imbalanced, as observed in many real-world
discrimination problems.
The social discrimination triggered by perpetual underestimation is not only unfair but also
socially inefficient. From the welfare perspective, if the time horizon (the total number of hiring
opportunities) is sufficiently long, then it is not very costly to “experiment” a small fraction of
minority workers for learning. However, because firms are selfish and myopic, they are not willing
to bear the cost of experiments on their own. Here, laissez-faire results in the underprovision of a
public good—the information about minority groups. By enforcing or incentivizing early movers
(firms) to review the minority groups, late movers can refer to a more useful data set of hiring cases,
leading to improvement of social welfare. Note that the policy intervention need not be persistent:
once sufficiently rich data are collected, the government can terminate the affirmative action and
return to laissez-faire.
We analyze the equilibrium consequence of laissez-faire and study desirable policy interventions.
Multi-armed bandit models are useful for quantifying the value of information as the width of
confidence bounds. We use a linear contextual bandit model to study whether a policy can lead
society to achieve “no regret” in the long run. The regret is one of the most popular criteria for
evaluating the performance of algorithms in multi-armed bandit problems. The regret measures
the welfare loss compared with the first-best decision rule (which firms would take when they had
perfect information about the statistical model). When the regret grows sublinearly in N , it means
that firms make fair and efficient decisions after a certain time.
In our theoretical analyses of laissez-faire, we first prove that it achieves no regret in the long
run: When the groups are ex ante symmetric and the population ratio is equal, the expected regret
of laissez-faire is shown to be O˜(
√
N), where O˜ is a Landau notation that ignores a logarithmic
factor. In contrast, when the population ratio is imbalanced (i.e., the number of majority workers
is larger than the number of minority workers), this result no longer holds. In such a case, the
expected regret is proven to be Ω˜(N), which implies that efficiency is not attained even in the long
run.7
7Many extant studies, such as Bardhi, Guo, and Strulovici (2019) and Monachou and Ashlagi (2019) have assumed
balanced population. To our knowledge, this is the first study to focus on the effect of imbalanced population in the
discrimination context.
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This paper studies two policy interventions towards fair and efficient social learning. The first
policy is a subsidy rule, based on the idea of the upper confidence interval algorithm (UCB). UCB
is an effective solution for balancing exploration and exploitation in the (standard single-agent)
multi-armed bandit problem (Lai and Robbins, 1985; Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer, 2002). By
incentivizing firms to take actions that are consistent with the recommendation of UCB, we can
lead the social learning to no regret in the long run. We achieve it by providing firms subsidies when
they hire a worker who belongs to an underexplored group. The subsidy is adjusted to the degree
of information externality; thus, its total amount shrinks as time goes. Formally, we show that the
UCB mechanism has expected regret of O˜(
√
N). The subsidy amount required for implementing
the UCB mechanism is also O˜(
√
N).
This paper further proposes a hybrid mechanism, which terminates affirmative actions once a
sufficiently rich data set is collected and returns to laissez-faire. In our setting, once firms obtain a
certain amount of data, the diversity of workers’ characteristics naturally promotes learning about
the minority group. Hence, even if we terminate the policy intervention earlier than a standard
UCB algorithm would do, society rarely falls into perpetual underestimation. We prove that our
hybrid mechanism achieves O˜(
√
N) regret with O˜(1) subsidy in N rounds. Furthermore, in our
simulation, the hybrid mechanism achieved smaller regret than the UCB mechanism.
The second policy is the Rooney Rule.8 The Rooney Rule is a “soft” affirmative action (in that
no hiring quota is required) and it does not require monetary compensation. Instead, the Rooney
Rule requires each firm to select at least one minority candidate as a finalist for each job opening. In
the final selection, firms can obtain additional signals, besides the observable characteristics shown
as an application document. The Rooney Rule leaves minority workers an opportunity to be hired.
Even when a firm underestimates a minority worker’s skill in the beginning (due to the prediction
inaccuracy), the worker may turn out to be the most attractive candidate once the interview is
done. As long as minority workers have a chance to be hired, perpetual underestimation will not
occur. However, our analysis also shows that the Rooney Rule may hinder hiring of skilled majority
candidates, and therefore, should not be adopted as a permanent policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
8The Rooney Rule is originally introduced to the National Football League, and the original version of the rule
required league teams to interview ethnic-minority candidates for head coaching and senior football operation jobs.
The rule is named after Dan Rooney, the former chairman of the league’s diversity committee (Eddo-Lodge, 2017).
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introduces the model. Section 4 studies the equilibrium consequence of laissez-faire. Section 5
develops the upper-confidence-bound subsidy rules, and Section 6 improves it further. Section 7
studies the two-stage model and analyze the performance of laissez-faire and the Rooney Rule.
Section 8 exhibits the simulation results. Section 9 describes this paper’s contribution to the multi-
armed bandit literature. In Section 10, we make concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
A survey by Fang and Moro (2011) classifies the literature of statistical discrimination broadly
into two strands. The first strand, originates from Arrow (1973), assumes that groups are ex ante
identical and analyzes how statistical discrimination occurs as an asymmetric equilibrium (e.g.,
Coate and Loury, 1993; Mailath et al., 2000; Moro and Norman, 2003, 2004; Gu and Norman, 2020).
This strand interprets statistical discrimination as a random selection of multiple equilibria and
does not explain why demographic minorities tend to be discriminated against. The second strand
of the literature, originates from Phelps (1972), studies discrimination triggered by unexplained
exogenous differences between groups, coupled with incomplete information about workers’ skills
(e.g., Aigner and Cain, 1977; Lundberg and Startz, 1983; Cornell and Welch, 1996). The difference
in the signal distribution of workers’ skill is one of the most popular assumptions in this strand.
This paper unifies these two strands in that we endogenize the difference in the signal distribution.
We consider otherwise ex ante identical individuals from different groups.9 Using a social learning
model, we demonstrate how the difference in the prediction of skills is generated and persists.
We find that when the population ratio of a group is small, the group tends to be statistically
discriminated against. Hence, in contrast to most papers in the first strand, our result indicates
that a minority group tends to suffer as an inevitable consequence under laissez-faire.
More recently, several works (e.g., Bohren et al., 2019a, 2019b; Monachou and Ashlagi, 2019)
demonstrate how misspecified beliefs about groups will result in discrimination. Thus far, this lit-
erature has attributed the belief misspecification to psychological bias (e.g., Judd and Park, 1993;
Hilton and Von Hippel, 1996) and bounded rationality (e.g., Fryer and Jackson, 2008; Schwartzstein, 2014;
Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2019). In contrast, we develop a model of fully rational
9The population imbalance is not an “unexplained” difference.
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agents and show that a misspecified belief persists (i.e., a minority group is perpetually underes-
timated) even in the long run. Our result supports a fundamental assumption of the belief-based
statistical discrimination literature.
We model statistical discrimination as a consequence of social learning. The previous studies
on social learning, herding, and information cascades have discussed how a sequence of myopic
agents reaches an incorrect conclusion with various settings (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000). A number of papers have studied the
improvement of social welfare through subsidy for exploration (e.g., Frazier, Kempe, Kleinberg,
and Kleinberg, 2014; Kannan, Kearns, Morgenstern, Pai, Roth, Vohra, and Wu, 2017) and se-
lective information disclosure (e.g., Kremer, Mansour, and Perry, 2014; Che and Ho¨rner, 2018;
Papanastasiou, Bimpikis, and Savva, 2018; Immorlica, Mao, Slivkins, and Wu, 2020; Mansour,
Slivkins, and Syrgkanis, 2020). Bohren et al. (2019b) and Monachou and Ashlagi (2019), which
are discussed above, study discrimination using social learning models. We develop a novel social
learning model for analyzing statistical discrimination and find that, under laissez-faire, society
tends to perpetually underestimate workers form a minority group, even when all firms are fully
rational and non-prejudiced.
A multi-armed bandit problem stems from the literature of statistics (Thompson, 1933; Robbins,
1952). The theme of this problem is how one long-lived decision maker can maximize his payoff
by balancing exploration and exploitation. More recently, the machine learning community has
proposed the contextual bandit framework, in which payoffs associated with “arms” (actions) not
only depend on the hidden state but are also influenced by additional information, called “contexts”
(Abe and Long, 1999; Langford and Zhang, 2008). To study statistical discrimination in labor
markets, we adopt the contextual bandit framework because it allows us to capture the diversity
of worker characteristics. For readers’ convenience, we summarize our technological contribution
to the contextual bandit literature in Section 9.
While most of the literature in multi-armed bandit has studied abstract models, Joseph, Kearns,
Morgenstern, and Roth (2016) and Kannan et al. (2017) apply contextual bandit frameworks to
human-related decision making. These two papers study contextual fairness, which is a stronger
concept than our notion of no-regret learning (while these two fairness notions are asymptotically
equivalent). Although Kannan et al. (2017) propose a contextually fair UCB-based subsidy rule, it
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requires an impractically large budget (because contextual fairness is a too stringent requirement
with finite horizon). Our subsidy rules also originate from the idea of UCB. However, as we show
theoretically and by simulation, our subsidy rules require a much smaller budget. Bardhi et al.
(2019) study a Bayesian bandit model in which a long-lived employer allocates a task to one of
the two workers from different groups.10 Bardhi et al. (2019) show that a small difference in the
prior belief about each worker’s type (associated with the the group the worker belongs to) could
generate a significant difference in payoffs of workers. In contrast, the focus of this paper is on how
society acquires a persistent misspecified belief about the minority group endogenously.
Some previous studies consider a linear contextual bandit problem and study the performance of
a “greedy” algorithm, which myopically makes decision in accordance with the current information
(Bastani, Bayati, and Khosravi, 2020; Kannan, Morgenstern, Roth, Waggoner, and Wu, 2018). As
firms take greedy actions under laissez-faire, their results are also relevant to our model. They show
that the greedy algorithm could lead to no regret in the long run, if (i) the contexts (corresponding
to workers’ characteristics in our model) are diverse enough, and (ii) the decision maker acquires
sufficiently many uniform samples in the beginning. While their results suggest that laissez-faire
performs well, uniform sampling is not adaptive, and thus does not adequately quantify the value
of information. Subsection 8.6 provides a detailed analysis on this point—we show that, our hybrid
mechanism performs better than uniform sampling followed by laissez-faire.
Theoretical analyses for the Rooney Rule are relatively scarce.11 Kleinberg and Raghavan
(2018) show that, when the recruiter has an unconscious bias against the discriminated group, the
Rooney Rule not only helps the representation of the discriminated group but also leads to a higher
payoff for the recruiter. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to demonstrate
the practical advantage of the Rooney Rule without unconscious bias. Our result indicates that
even when no unconscious bias exists, the Rooney Rule may improve social welfare by preventing
perpetual underestimation.
10As a decision maker is a long-lived employer, Bardhi et al. (2019) belongs to the literature on dynamic employer
learning (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001), not to the social learning literature.
11De Paola et al. (2010) show that a soft gender quota imposed on an Italian local administration broke down
negative stereotypes towards women even after it was terminated. This quota can be regarded as a version of the
Rooney Rule.
9
3 Model
Basic Setting We develop a linear contextual bandit problem with myopic agents (firms). We
consider a situation where N firms (indexed by n = 1, . . . , N) sequentially hire one worker for each.
In each round n, a set of workers I(n) arrives. Each worker i ∈ I(n) takes no action, and firm n
selects one worker ι(n) ∈ I(n). We denote the set of all workers by I := ⋃Nn=1 I(n). Both firms and
workers are short-lived. Once round n is finished, firm n’s payoff is finalized, and all the workers
not hired leave the market.
Each worker i belongs to a group g ∈ G. We assume that the population ratio is fixed: for
every round n, the number of arrived workers who belong to group g is Kg ∈ N and K =
∑
g∈GKg.
Slightly abusing the notation, we denote the group worker i belongs to by g(i). Each worker i ∈ I
also has an observable characteristic xi ∈ Rd, where d ∈ N is its dimension. Finally, each worker
i also has a skill yi ∈ R, which is not observable until worker i is hired. The characteristics and
skills are random variables.
Because each firm’s payoff is equal to the hired worker’s skill yi (plus the subsidy assigned to
worker i as an affirmative action, if any), firms want to predict the skill yi based on the character-
istics xi. We assume that the characteristics and skills are associated in the following way:
yi = x
′
iθg(i) + i,
where θg ∈ Rd is a coefficient parameter, and i ∼ N (0, σ2 ) i.i.d. is an unpredictable error term. We
assume ||θg|| ≤ S for some S ∈ R+, where || · || is the standard L2-norm. Since i is unpredictable,
qi := x
′
iθg(i) (1)
is the best predictor of worker i’s skill yi.
The coefficient parameters (θg)g∈G are unknown in the beginning. Hence, unless firms share
the information about past hiring cases, firms are unable to predict each worker’s skill yi. We
assume that all firms share information about hiring cases. Accordingly, when firm n makes a
decision, besides current workers’ characteristics and groups (xi, g(i))i∈I(n), firm n can observe all
the past candidate workers’ characteristics and groups, (xi, g(i)) for all i ∈
⋃n−1
n′=1 I(n
′), the past
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firms’ decisions (ι(n′))n−1n′=1, and the past hired workers’ skills (yι(n′))
n−1
n′=1. We refer to all of the
realizations of these variables as the history in round n, and denote it by h(n). Formally, h(n) is
given by
h(n) =
(
(xi, g(i))i∈I(n), (xi, g(i))i∈⋃n−1
n′=1 I(n
′), (ι(n
′))n−1n′=1, (yι(n′))
n−1
n′=1
)
.
Note that, h(n) does not include the information about (i) the worker hired in firm n, and (ii)
that worker’s actual skill. This is because h(n) represents the information set firm n faces when it
makes a hiring decision. We define the set of all histories in round n as H(n). We define the set of
all histories as H :=
⋃N
n=1H(n). The firm’s decision rule for hiring and the government’s subsidy
rule will be defined as a function that maps a history to a hiring decision and the subsidy amount
(described later). For notational convenience, we often drop h(n).
Prediction We assume that firms are not Bayesian but frequentist. Hence, firms have no prior
distribution but they estimate the true parameter θ using the available data set.
We assume that each firm predicts the skill by using ridge regression (also known as regularized
least square) to stabilize the small-sample inference. Let Ng(n) be the number of rounds at which
group-g workers are hired by round n. Let Xg(n) ∈ RNg(n)×d be a matrix that lists the characteris-
tics of group-g workers hired by round n: each row of Xg(n) corresponds to {xι(n′) : ι(n′) = g}n−1n′=1.
Likewise, let Yg(n) ∈ RNg(n) be a vector that lists the skills of group-g workers hired by round n:
each element of Yg(n) corresponds to {yι(n′) : ι(n′) = g}n−1n′=1. We define Vg(n) := (Xg(n))′Xg(n).
For a parameter λ > 0, we define V¯g(n) = Vg(n) +λId, where Id denotes the d× d identity matrix.
Firm n estimates the parameter as follows:
θˆg(n) := (V¯g(n))
−1(Xg(n))′Yg(n). (2)
Unlike ordinary least square (OLS), for λ > 0 the inverse (V¯g(n))−1 is always well-defined. Firm n
predicts worker i’s skill by (1), while substituting θg with θˆg(n):
qˆi(n) := x
′
iθˆg(i)(n).
Note that, both qˆi(n) and θˆg(n) depend on the history h(n). We often drop h(n) for notational
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simplicity.
Mechanism Besides the (predicted) skill of workers, firms also take the subsidies provided as
affirmative actions into consideration. We assume that firms’ preferences are risk-neutral and
quasi-linear. Hence, if firm n hires worker i, firm n’s payoff (von-Neumann–Morgenstern utility) is
given by yi + si, where where si ∈ R+ denotes the amount of the subsidy assigned to worker i.
In the beginning of the game, the government commits to a subsidy rule si(n, ·) : H → R+,
which maps a history to a subsidy amount. Hence, once a history h(n) is specified, firm n can
identify the subsidy assigned to each worker i ∈ I(n). Firm n attempts to maximize
E [yi + si(n;h(n))|h(n)] = qˆi(n;h(n)) + si(n;h(n)).
Firm n’s decision rule ι(n, ·) : H(n) → I(n) specifies the worker firm n hires given a history
h(n). We say that, a decision rule ι is implemented by a subsidy rule si if for all n, for all h(n), we
have
ι(n;h(n)) = arg max
i∈I(n)
{qˆi(n;h(n)) + si(n;h(n))} . (3)
We call a pair of a decision rule and subsidy rule a mechanism.
Throughout this paper, any ties are broken in an arbitrary way. Again, we often drop h(n)
from the input of decision rule ι when it does not cause confusion.
Remark 1 (Observability of the Past Hiring Data). While we assume that firms share the entire
history of past hiring data for simplicity, practically, each firm may have limited access to the
database. Even if we make such an assumption, our analysis and results will not require qualitative
changes. Rational firms estimate θg based on the available data and use it to predict workers’ skills.
The smaller the sample size of the available data is, the severer the data insufficiency of minority
workers is.
Social Welfare We measure social welfare by the smallness of regret, which is the standard
measure to evaluate the performance of algorithms in multi-armed bandit models. The regret is
defined as follows:
Reg(N) :=
N∑
n=1
{
max
i∈I(n)
qi − qι(n)
}
.
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Since i is unpredictable, it is natural to evaluate the performance of the algorithm (or the equi-
librium consequence of the policy intervention) by checking the value of predictors qi. If the
parameter (θg)g∈G were known, each firm could easily calculate qi for each worker i and choose
ι(n) = arg maxi∈I(n) qi. In this case, the regret would become zero. However, since (θg)g∈G is
unknown, it is too demanding to aim at zero regret. The goal of the policy design is to set up
a mechanism that minimizes the expected regret E[Reg(N)], where the expectation is taken on a
random draw of the workers.12 This aim is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the skills of the
hired workers.
Following the literature, we mainly evaluate the performance by the limiting behavior (order) of
expected regrets. One useful benchmark is whether the expected regret is linear (i.e., E[Reg(N)] =
Ω(N)) or sublinear (i.e., E[Reg(N)] = o(N)).13 As we described above, once (θg)g∈G is known,
firms can use the best predictor qi to evaluate workers. After that point, regret does not increase.
Although (θg)g∈G is unknown ex ante, firms can learn it from the data. A linear regret means that
society fails to learn the underlying parameter (θg)g∈G, and therefore, firms are hiring less-skilled
workers even in the long run. In our model, perpetual underestimation is often a consequence
of statistical discrimination—typically, minority workers are more likely to be underexplored, and
therefore, they are unfairly rejected.
Budget Some of the policies we study incentivize exploration by subsidization. The total budget
required by a subsidy rule is also an important policy concern. The total amount of the subsidy is
given by
Sub(N) :=
N∑
n=1
sι(n)(n).
Initial Sampling Phase For analytical tractability, we assume that for the first N (0) rounds,
each firm n is forced to hire from a pre-specified group, gn. We refer to the first N (0) rounds as
the initial sampling phase (Algorithm 1). Namely, for all n = 1, . . . , N (0), firm n hires a group-gn
12All the mechanisms proposed in this paper are deterministic. Hence, there is no algorithmic randomness.
13In the literature of the multi-armed bandit problem, sublinear regret is also referred as no regret since the regret
per round approaches zero as N →∞.
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Algorithm 1 Initial Sampling Phase
{gn}N(0)n=1 is allocated such that
∑N(0)
n=1 1[gn = g] = N
(0)
g .
for n = 1, · · · , N (0) do
Hire ι(n;h(n)) = mini∈I(n):g(i)=gn i. . Firm n blindly hires a group-gn candidate.
end for
candidate who has the smallest agent number:
ι(n;h(n)) = min
i∈I(n)
i subject to g(i) = gn. (4)
Choosing an agent who has the smallest number is just a random choice. Whenever agents belong
to the same group, their characteristics and skill distributions are the same. Accordingly, (4) is
equivalent to choosing a group-gn worker blindly (i.e., uniformly at random without looking at
workers’ predicted skills). We define N (0)g :=
∑N(0)
n=1 1[gn = g] as the data size of initial sampling
for group g. The initial sampling phase is exogenous and not regarded as a part of the mechanism.
Hence, we ignore the incentives and payoffs of firms hiring in the initial sampling phase.
4 Laissez-Faire
This section analyzes the equilibrium under laissez-faire, that is, the consequence of social learning
when policy intervention is absent. Subsection 4.1 introduces a basic fact: laissez-faire has linear
regret in a general domain. However, a general domain is not suitable for the analysis of statistical
discrimination. Hence, in Subsection 4.2, we define a symmetric and diverse environment, with
which we can discuss how statistical discrimination grows. In Subsection 4.3, we formally define
perpetual underestimation and discuss its implications. Subsection 4.4 describes the case where
(i) both of the groups have sufficient variation, and (ii) the population ratio is balanced. In this
case, the underestimation of minority groups is spontaneously resolved, and therefore, laissez-faire
performs well. However, as shown in Subsection 4.5, when the population ratio is imbalanced,
laissez-faire tends to result in perpetual underestimation, and therefore, performs poorly.
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Algorithm 2 Laissez-Faire
Complete the initial sampling phase by running Algorithm 1.
for n = N (0) + 1, · · · , N do . Laissez-Faire starts.
Offer si(n) = 0 for all i ∈ I(n). . No Subsidy is provided.
Firm n hires ι(n) = arg maxi x′iθˆg(i)(n) as an equilibrium consequence.
end for
4.1 Preliminary: Failure in a General Domain
We first define laissez-faire.
Definition 1 (Laissez-Faire). The laissez-faire decision rule always selects the worker who has the
highest predicted skill, i.e.,
ι(n) = arg max
i∈I(n)
qˆi(n).
Clearly, the laissez-faire decision rule is implemented by the laissez-faire subsidy rule, which provide
no subsidy si = 0 after any history (Algorithm 2).
Laissez-faire makes no intervention, and therefore, each firm hires the worker whose expected
skill, predicted by the current data set, is the highest. In the multi-armed bandit literature, the
laissez-faire decision rule is referred to as the greedy algorithm. The greedy algorithm often results
in a catastrophic outcome due to insufficient exploration. Since information is a public good, its
supply is inefficiently low if the government makes no policy intervention. This well-known result
applies to our environment if no structure is assumed. We state this basic result as a benchmark.
Theorem 1 (Failure of Laissez-Faire in General Domain). Let RegLF be the regret under the
laissez-faire decision rule. There exists an instance with which
E[RegLF(N)] = Ω(N).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
The analysis in Appendix B.2 is essentially the same as the analysis of greedy algorithm in
the standard K-armed bandit problem,14 which is well-known to be Ω(N). We show Theorem 1
14The example we consider in the proof fixes the context of each worker, and the problem boils down to the standard
K-armed bandit problem without context.
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by constructing an instance explicitly. By assuming that the distribution of the characteristics
(xi) to be degenerate, our linear contextual bandit problem reduces to a basic K-armed bandit
problem, where the expected skill (reward) of each group (arm) is fixed. We assume that one
group is more productive than another, and therefore, the first-best decision rule would always
hire from the better group. With a constant probability, firms happen to underestimate the more
productive group in the beginning. When a less productive group constantly performs better than
the underestimated predicted skill of the better group, firms never want to investigate the better
group further. Consequently, with a significant probability, a worker from the better group is
never hired again, implying linear expected regret. Once an underestimation of the minority group
occurs, it tends to persist: When the “context” of the majority group is fixed, there is a constant
probability that the minority group is never chosen throughout all the rounds.
4.2 Symmetry and Diverse Characteristics
It is too naive to conclude from Theorem 1 that the laissez-faire decision rule may cause statistical
discrimination. First, the instance constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 assumes an unexplained
exogenous difference (in expected skills) between groups, while our aim is to endogenize the dif-
ference. Second, we assumed that one group has higher expected skill than the other. With this
assumption, it is efficient to always hire a worker from one group. Under such an assumption, when
social learning is successful, workers from the inferior group are never hired. Third, we reduced a
contextual bandit model to a K-armed bandit model by assuming that the distribution of charac-
teristics is degenerate. However, in the real word, candidate workers have diverse characteristics,
even when they belong to the same group.
To provide better analysis for the laissez-faire decision rule, we make the following three as-
sumptions. First, we focus on the case of two groups.
Assumption 1 (Two Groups). The population consists of two groups G = {1, 2}.
When we consider asymmetric groups and equilibria, we refer to group 1 as a majority (domi-
nant) group and group 2 as a minority (discriminated) group. The two-group assumption helps us
to elucidate how the minority group is discriminated against by the majority group.
Second, we assume that groups are symmetric.
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Assumption 2 (Symmetric Groups). The characteristics of all groups are identically distributed,
and the coefficient parameters are the same across all groups. Namely, a probability distribution
F such that for all i ∈ I,
xi ∼ F,
and there exists θ ∈ Rd such that for all g ∈ G,
θg = θ.
Note that although we assume that groups are symmetric, firms do not see them as symmetric,
and therefore, apply different statistical models for different groups. In other words, even though
the true coefficients are identical (θg = θ′g for all g, g′ ∈ G), firms estimate them separately; thus,
the values of the estimated coefficients are typically different (θˆg(n) 6= θˆg′(n) for g 6= g′).
Although Assumption 2 is unrealistic (as it is evident that the characteristics should be inter-
preted differently), it is useful for elucidating how laissez-faire nourishes statistical discrimination.
Under Assumption 2, there is no ex ante difference between groups (as assumed in Arrow, 1973;
Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and Norman, 2004, etc.). Hence, all the differences we observe in the
equilibrium consequence are purely due to the property of the equilibrium learning process.
Under Assumption 2, statistical discrimination implies inefficiency: although a best candidate
belongs to a minority group with substantial probability (K2/K), that candidate is not hired
due to underexploration. Hence, when the groups are symmetric, the resolution of statistical
discrimination make the hiring process not only fair but also efficient. By contrast, when there is
exogenous asymmetry between groups, fairness and efficiency are often conflicting. For example,
demographic parity is one of the most popular fairness notions studied in machine learning (or
supervised learning) literature. In our model, the demographic parity requires that the probability
of hiring from the minority group is equal to the population ratio; i.e., K2/K. Clearly, when the
groups are asymmetric, the “first-best decision rule” does not satisfy this condition—it hires more
from a “more productive group,” while it is arguable that such a decision rule is socially desirable.
As long as we assume the group symmetry, our argument avoids this controversy: The first-best
decision rule is fair and efficient. Thus, we should attempt to approximate it.
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Third, we assume that characteristics are normally distributed, and therefore, the distribution
is non-degenerate. This assumption captures the diversity of workers, which is the nature of the
real-world labor market.
Assumption 3 (Normally Distributed Characteristics). For every candidate i,
xi ∼ N (µxg(i), σ2xg(i)Id),
where µxg ∈ Rd and σxg ∈ R++ for every g ∈ G. We also denote xi = µxg(i) + exi to highlight the
noise term exi.
Note that when we have both Assumptions 2 and 3, then there exist µx, σx such that
µxg = µx,
σxg = σx,
for all g ∈ G. Hence, xi ∼ N (µx, σ2xId) for all i ∈ I.
4.3 Perpetual Underestimation
To determine whether social learning incurs linear expected regret or not, it is useful to check
whether it results in perpetual underestimation with a significant probability.
Definition 2 (Perpetual Underestimation). A group g0 is perpetually underestimated if, for all
n > N (0), we have g(ι(n)) 6= g0.
Namely, when group g0 is perpetually underestimated, no worker from group g0 is hired after
the initial sampling phase.
If social learning results in perpetual underestimation with a significant probability, then it
often incurs linear expected regret. In particular, under Assumptions 2, perpetual underestimation
against any group g ∈ G implies that firms fail to hire at least
Kg
K
(
N −N (0)
)
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best candidate workers, which is linear in N . Hence, if the probability of perpetual underestimation
is constant (independent of N), then we have linear expected regret.
In our model, perpetual underestimation is also closely related to social discrimination. When
perpetual underestimation occurs, a candidate who belongs to an underestimated group is not hired,
while groups are symmetric. This outcome happens because society cannot accurately predict the
skills of minority workers due to the lack of data. Hence, in our model, perpetual discrimination
can be regarded as a form of statistical discrimination.
4.4 Sublinear Regret with Balanced Population
This section analyzes the case where is only one candidate arrives at each round for both groups.
In this case, the variation of context implicitly urges the firms to explore all the groups with some
frequency. Consequently, laissez-faire has sublinear regret, implying that statistical discrimination
is eventually resolved, spontaneously.
Theorem 2 (Sublinear Regret with Balanced Population). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
Suppose also that Kg = 1 for g = 1, 2. Then, the expected regret is bounded as
E[RegLF(N)] ≤ Cbal
√
N
where Cbal is a O˜(1) factor that depends on model parameters. Here, O˜(1) is a Landau notation
that ignores polylogarithmic factors.15 Letting µx = ||µx||, the factor Cbal is inverse proportional
to Φc(µx/σx), which is approximately scales as exp(−(µx/σx)2/2).
Proof. See Appendix B.3. The explicit form of Cbal is found at the end of the Appendix B.3.
The crux of the analysis here is whether the perpetual underestimation is prevented. Assume
that group 2 is underestimated, which happens with some constant probability. The ratio µx/σx
represents the stability of characteristics. The larger this value is, the more stable the skill of
candidates. If µx/σx is small, there is some probability such that the skill of the group-1 candidate
is predicted to be bad. In such a case, the candidate from group 2 might be chosen, which updates
15Namely, there exists N0 ∈ N and a function f(N) that is finite-order polynomial of logN such that E[RegLF(N)] ≤
f(N) for all N ≥ N0. In this and subsequent theorems, we often ignore polylogarithmic factors (factors that are
finite-order polynomial of the logarithm) of N because they grow very slowly as N grows large. We remark on the
important dependence on model parameters and refer to the equation of explicit formulae of each factor.
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the belief about group 2 to resolve underestimation. As is expected by the theory of least squares,
the standard deviation of θˆg(n) is proportional to (V¯g(n))−1/2, and we show that its diameter
(λmin(V¯g(n)))
−1/2 shrinks as O˜(1/
√
n). The regret per error is defined by this quantity, and the
total regret is O˜(
∑
n≤N (1/
√
n)) = O˜(
√
N).
Theorem 3 shows that statistical discrimination is resolved spontaneously when the candidate
variation is large. At a glance, this appears to be in contradiction with widely known results
that states laissez-faire may lead to suboptimal results in bandit problems due to underexplo-
ration. Since selfish firms do not want to experiment with underrepresented groups at their own
risk, laissez-faire perpetually underestimates the skill of the minority group (as demonstrated in
Theorem 1). However, the variation in characteristics naturally incentivizes selfish agents to ex-
plore the underestimated group, and therefore, with some additional conditions, we can bound the
probability of perpetual underestimation.
Theorem 2 shares some intuitions with the previous results (Bastani et al., 2020; Kannan et al.,
2018), which have shown that the variation in contexts (characteristics) improves the performance of
the greedy algorithm (laissez-faire) in contextual multi-armed bandit problems. However, Theorem
2 is novel to the literature. Bastani et al. (2020) consider the case at which all the groups share
the coefficient parameter, and Kannan et al. (2018) assume that there is a sufficiently long initial
sampling phase, in which society can collect the uniform-sample data until the model parameters
are stabilized. Theorem 2 does not rely on these assumptions.
More importantly, in the next subsection, we prove that these positive results are “special
cases”—we will show that, even when there is a variation in characteristics, when the popula-
tion ratio imbalanced, the laissez-faire decision rule may cause perpetual underestimation with a
substantial probability.
4.5 Large Regret with Imbalanced Population
While Theorem 2 implies that statistical discrimination might be spontaneously resolved in the
long run (if we admit that workers’ characteristics are diverse enough), it crucially relies on one un-
realistic assumption—the balanced population ratio. In many real-world problems, the population
ratio is imbalanced. The dominant group is often the majority of the population, and the discrim-
inated is minority. Even when the population demographically balanced, if we look at a specific
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labor market, the population ratio could be imbalanced due to an imbalanced wealth distribution
or discouragement of human capital investments.
We indeed find that the population ratio between groups has a crucial role for the welfare under
laissez-faire. In the following theorem, we assume that, in each round, while only one minority
worker arrives (i.e., K2 = 1), while many majority workers (K1 > 1) arrive. When the population
is imbalanced, perpetual underestimation becomes more likely, and therefore, society suffers from
a large expected regret.
Theorem 3 (Large Regret with Imbalanced Population). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Sup-
pose also that K2 = 1 and d = 1. Let K1 > log2N . Then, under the laissez-faire decision rule,
group 2 is perpetually underestimated with the probability at least Cimb = Θ˜(1). Accordingly, the
expected regret of the laissez-faire decision rule is
E
[
RegLF(N)
]
≥ Cimb(N −N
(0))
K
= Ω˜(N).
Proof. See Appendix B.4. The explicit form of Cimb is found at Eq. (39).
In the proof of Theorem 3, we evaluate the probability of the following two events occuring. (i)
The coefficient parameter for the minority candidates, θ2 is underestimated. (ii) The characteristics
and skills of the hired majority workers are consistently good throughout the rounds. The proba-
bility of (i) is constant (independent of N) and the probability of (ii) is constant if K1 > log2N .
When both (i) and (ii) occur, minority workers are perpetually underestimated, and therefore, we
have a large regret.
Theorem 3 indicates that we should not be too optimistic about the consequence of laissez-faire.
The imbalance in the population ratio naturally favors the majority group by helping society to
collect a richer data set about them, leading to statistical discrimination. This insight applies to
many real-world problems because an imbalanced population is a commonplace.
Remark 2. In the proof of Theorem 3, we explicitly bound the probability that each event happens.
Hence, the effect of initial sample size is revealed. The probability of underestimating the minority
group is exponentially small to the number initial samples for minorities, N (0)2 , which implies that
small number of initiators in the minority group can prevent the underestimation to be perpet-
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uated.16 Note also that this is consistent with the prior results by Kannan et al. (2018), which
state a sufficiently large initial samples prevent perpetual underestimation because it alleviates the
underestimation of θˆ2. In Subsection 8.6, we demonstrate that this solution is not desirable because
uniform sampling is costly and difficult to implement. According to our simulation, the UCB-based
subsidy rule (the hybrid mechanism, proposed in Section 6) outperforms uniform sampling followed
by laissez-faire.
5 The Upper Confidence Bound Mechanism
Section 4 has discussed the equilibrium consequence under laissez-faire. We observed that, when the
population ratio is imbalanced (as in the real-world job market), there is a substantial probability
that the underestimation is perpetuated. This result indicates that a policy intervention (affirmative
action) is effective for improving social welfare and fairness of the hiring market.
This section proposes a subsidy rule to resolve such a perpetual underestimation. We use the
idea of the upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm, which is widely used in the literature of
the bandit problem.17 The UCB algorithm balances exploration and exploitation by allocating
handicaps to less explored arms (groups), whose rewards (skills) cannot be predicted accurately.
The UCB algorithm develops a confidence interval for the true reward and evaluate each arm’s
performance by its upper confidence bound to achieve this balance. Although firms are not willing
to follow the UCB’s recommendation under laissez-faire, the government can provide a subsidy to
promote a candidate worker who has the highest UCB. In this section, we establish a UCB-based
subsidy rule and evaluate its performance.
5.1 The UCB Decision Rule
To establish the UCB-based subsidy rule, we first define the hiring decision suggested by the UCB
algorithm. After that, we construct a subsidy rule that incentivizes firms to hire workers based on
UCB. A challenge is that the adaptive selection of the candidates based on history can induce some
bias, and the standard confidence bound no longer applies to our case. To overcome this issue,
16See Lemma 24 (in the Appendix) for the full detail.
17The idea of UCB goes back to at least in 1980s. The seminal paper by Lai and Robbins (1985) analyzed a
version of UCB. More recently, Auer et al. (2002) introduced UCB1, which is widely known in the machine learning
literature.
22
we use martingale inequalities (Pen˜a, Lai, and Shao, 2008; Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis, 2010;
Abbasi-Yadkori, Pa´l, and Szepesva´ri, 2011). We here introduce the confidence interval for the true
coefficient parameter, (θg)g∈G.
Definition 3 (Confidence Interval, Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011). Given the group g’s collected
data matrix V¯g(n), the confidence interval of group g’s coefficient parameter θg is given by
Cg(n) =
θ¯g ∈ Rd : ∥∥∥θ¯g − θˆg(n)∥∥∥V¯g(n) ≤ σ
√
d log
(
det(V¯g(n))1/2 det(λId)−1/2
δ
)
+ λ1/2S

where ||v||A =
√
v′Av for a d-dimensional vector v and d× d matrix A.
The standard confidence interval, Cg(n), shrinks as firm n has a richer set of data about group
g. Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011) study the property of this confidence interval, and they prove that
the true parameter θg lies in Cg(n) with a probability 1− δ (Lemma 19). If we choose sufficiently
small δ,18 it is “safe” to assess that worker i’s skill is at most
q˜i(n) := max
θ¯g(i)∈Cg(i)(n)
x′iθ¯g(i).
We call q˜i(n) the upper confidence bound index (UCB index) of worker i’s skill. Intuitively, q˜i(n) is
worker i’s skill in the most optimistic scenario. The UCB decision rule makes a decision based on
this UCB index.
Definition 4 (UCB Decision Rule). The UCB decision rule selects the worker who has the highest
UCB index; i.e.,
ι(n) = arg max
i∈I(n)
q˜i(n). (5)
The UCB index q˜i(n) is close to the pointwise estimate qˆi(n) when society has a rich data about
group g(i), because Cg(i)(n) is small in such a case. However, when the information about group
g(i) is insufficient, q˜i(n) is much larger than qˆi(n), because the firm is not sure about the true skill
of worker i and Cg(i)(n) is large. In this sense, the UCB decision rule offers affirmative actions
to underexplored groups. In contrast to the greedy algorithm (laissez-faire), the UCB algorithm
18We typically choose δ = 1/N so that the confidence interval is asymptotically correct in the limit of N →∞.
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appropriately balances exploration and exploitation, and therefore, it has a sublinear expected
regret in general environments.
The UCB decision rule recommends the exploration of majority candidates as well as minor-
ity candidates. The amount of the subsidy is proportional to the uncertainty of the candidate’s
characteristic, which is represented by the confidence interval Cg(n). The confidence interval Cg(n)
is inverse proportional to V¯g(n) = (Xg(n))′Xg(n) + λId.19 Hence, if the data Vg(n) do not have
a large variation in a particular dimension of xi, then the prediction from that dimension can be
inaccurate. In such a case, the UCB decision rule recommends hiring a candidate who contributes
to increasing the data variation for that dimension. For example, when a candidate has some skills
that previous candidates do not have, then the candidate’s UCB index tends to become large.
As the UCB decision rule nicely balances exploration and experimentation, it has a sublinear
regret for a general environment.
Theorem 4 (Sublinear Regret of UCB). Suppose Assumptions 3. Let RegUCB be the regret from
the UCB decision rule. Let λ ≥ max(1, L2). Then, by choosing sufficiently small δ, the regret
under the UCB decision rule is bounded as
E[RegUCB(N)] ≤ Cucb
√
N,
where Cucb is a O˜(1) factor to N that depends on model parameters.
Proof. See Appendix B.5. The explicit form of Cucb is found in Eq. (43) therein.
Note that, O˜(
√
N) regret is the optimal rate for these sequential optimization problems under
partial feedback (Chu, Li, Reyzin, and Schapire, 2011). Hence, Theorem 4 states that the UCB
decision rule effectively prevents perpetual underestimation and is asymptotically efficient. The
analysis here does not depend on the size of candidate pool K, and thus effective regardless of the
population ratio.
19The standard ordinary least square has a confidence bound of the form θg − θˆg(n) ∼ N (0, σ2V −1g (n)) and thus
|θg − θˆg(n)| ∼ σV −1/2g (n). The martingale confidence bound Cg(n) is larger than OLS confidence bound in two
factors because of the price of adaptivity. Namely, (1)
√
d factor and (2)
√
log(det(V¯g(n))) factor. As discussed
in Xu, Honda, and Sugiyama (2018), the first
√
d factor unnecessarily overestimates the confidence bound for most
cases.
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Algorithm 3 The UCB Index Subsidy Rule
Complete the initial sampling phase by running Algorithm 1.
for n = N (0) + 1, · · · , N do . The UCB index subsidy rule starts.
for i do
Compute q˜i(n) = maxθ¯g(i)∈Cg(i)(n) x
′
iθ¯g(i). . Obtain UCB indices.
Offer si = q˜i(n)− qˆi(n) for all i ∈ I(n). . Align firm n’s payoff to the UCB index.
Firm n hires ι(n) = arg maxi∈I(n) q˜i(n) as an equilibrium consequence.
end for
end for
Remark 3. Although we have made several strong assumptions for the analysis of laissez-faire (e.g.,
two groups, symmetry), Theorem 4 does not rely on them, and therefore, it is applicable to a very
general environment. The groups need not be symmetric. The normal characteristic assumption
(Assumption 3) can be relaxed to a weaker condition that guarantees that the distributions are
light-tailed, or the characteristics can even be arbitrary as long as they are bounded with high
probability.
5.2 The UCB Index Subsidy Rule
To implement the UCB decision rule, we need to satisfy the firms’ obedience condition (3) along
with the UCB’s decision rule (5). In this paper, we focus on two types of subsidy rules. One is the
UCB index subsidy rule, and another is the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule.
First, we formally define the UCB index subsidy rule. The UCB index subsidy rule induces
firms to hire a candidate with the largest UCB index by aligning each firm’s profit with the UCB
index.
Definition 5 (UCB Index Subsidy Rule). The UCB index subsidy rule s subsidizes worker i who
arrives in round n by
si(n;h(n)) = q˜i(n;h(n))− qˆi(n;h(n)).
The formal algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3.
The UCB index subsidy rule is named “index” because it belongs to an index policy (Gittins,
1979) in the terminology of the multi-armed bandit literature.
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Definition 6 (Index Policy). A subsidy rule s is an index policy if for all n and i ∈ I(n), si(n; ·)
only depends on Xg(i)(n), Yg(i)(n),xi.
To be more precise, our definition of the index rule is slightly weaker than the standard defini-
tion. A standard definition requires that the index of an arm only depends on the data generated
by the arm. However, since we regard a set of arms as a group, it does not make sense to focus
on the data generated by “an arm.” Hence, we utilize all the data about group g(i). Having said
that, our definition requires that the subsidy for worker i is independent of (i) the other agents’
characteristics xj for any j ∈ I(n) \ {i} and (ii) the data about other groups, Xg′(n) for any
g′ 6= g(i).
If a subsidy rule is an index policy, the government need not observe the characteristics of
I(n) \ {i} to determine the subsidy assigned to the employment of worker i. This is a practically
desirable property: In many real-world problems, it is difficult for the government to observe the
characteristics of candidate workers who are not hired.
The following theorem states the property of the UCB index subsidy rule. Among all index
subsidy rules that implement the UCB decision rule, the UCB index subsidy rule requires the
minimum amount of the subsidy. Its expected amount is proven to be O˜(
√
N).
Theorem 5 (Sublinear Subsidy of the UCB Index Rule).
1. The UCB index subsidy rule implements the UCB decision rule.
2. The UCB index subsidy rule needs a minimum amount of the subsidies among all subsidy
rules that (i) implement the UCB decision rule, and (ii) str an index policy. Formally, let sU-I
be the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule and s be an arbitrary subsidy rule that satisfies (i) and
(ii). Then, for all i, n and h(n), we have
sU-Ii (n;h(n)) ≤ si(n;h(n)).
3. Under the same assumptions as Theorem 4, the amount of the subsidy required by the UCB
index subsidy rule is bounded as
E[SubUCB-I(N)] ≤ Cucb
√
N.
26
Algorithm 4 The UCB Cost-Saving Subsidy Rule
Complete the initial sampling phase by running Algorithm 1.
for n = N (0) + 1, · · · , N do . The UCB cost-saving subsidy rule starts.
for i do
Compute qˆi(n) = x′iθˆg(i)(n).
Compute q˜i(n) = maxθ¯g(i)∈Cg(i)(n) x
′
iθ¯g(i).
Compute ι(n) = arg maxi∈I(n) q˜i(n). . ι(n) is the UCB winner.
Offer sι(n)(n) = maxj∈I(n) qˆj(n)− qˆι(n)(n). . Make ι(n) becomes most profitable.
Offer sj(n) = 0 for all j ∈ I(n) \ {ι(n)}.
Firm n hires ι(n) as an equilibrium consequence.
end for
end for
where Cucb is an O˜(1) factor that is the same as Theorem 4.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
The square-root subsidy implies that the government can eventually end the subsidy because
SubUCB-I(N)/N → 0 as N → ∞. Alternatively, Theorem 5 implies that society can terminate
affirmative actions once a sufficiently rich data set about the minority groups is obtained.
5.3 The UCB Cost-Saving Subsidy Rule
If the mechanism does not have to be an index policy (i.e., the subsidy for worker i ∈ I(n) may
depend on (xj)j∈I(n) of the other candidates), then we can save the budget without modifying
the decision rule. To achieve it, we can subsidize the minimum amount such that candidate ι is
more profitable than the other candidates. Formally, the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule is defined
as follows.
Definition 7 (UCB Cost-Saving Subsidy Rule). For every round n, the UCB cost-saving subsidy
rule chooses si(n) = 0 for every i ∈ I(n) \ {ι(n)}, where ι(n) is the candidate worker selected by
the UCB algorithm, (5). For i = ι(n), the subsidy si is given by
si(n;h(n)) = max
j∈I(n)
qˆj(n;h(n))− qˆi(n;h(n)).
The formal algorithm is shown as Algorithm 3.
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The UCB cost-saving subsidy rule subsidizes only the targeted worker, ι(n). Hence, for other
workers j 6= ι(n), the payoff from the employment is qˆj(n). The UCB cost-saving subsidy rule
sets the subsidy amount sι(n) in such a way that the payoff from hiring worker ι(n), which is
q˜ι(n)(n) + sι(n), is equal to (or slightly larger than) the payoff from hiring the worker who has the
highest predicted skill, maxj∈I(n) q˜j(n).
Clearly, the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule is the subsidy rule that requires the minimum budget
to implement the UCB decision rule. As fines (negative subsidies) are not allowed in our model, the
government cannot discourage the employment of the other candidate workers, j ∈ I(n) \ {ι(n)},
further. Hence, the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule requires the smallest budget among all subsidy
rules that implements the decision rule (5).
Combining this observation with Theorem 5, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Sublinear Subsidy of the UCB Cost-Saving Rule).
1. The UCB cost-saving subsidy rule implements the UCB decision rule.
2. The UCB cost-saving subsidy requires the minimum budget for implementing the UCB de-
cision rule. Formally, let sU-CS be the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule and s be an arbitrary
subsidy rule that implements the UCB decision rule. Then, for all i, n and h(n), we have
sU-CSi (n;h(n)) ≤ si(n;h(n)).
3. The amount of the subsidy required by the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule is bounded as
E[SubUCB-CS(N)] ≤ E[SubUCB-I(N)] ≤ Cucb
√
N.
Proof. The first two statements straightforwardly follow from the argument above. The last state-
ment follows from the first two and Theorem 5.
The cost-saving subsidy rule has some drawbacks. It depends on the characteristics of all the
potential candidates. Hence, the government must have precise knowledge about candidates who
appeared in each round but were not hired by the firm. Still, as a theoretical benchmark, it is useful
to study the minimum subsidy amount incurred. In Subsection 8.4, we compare the index rule and
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cost-saving rule numerically. Our simulation results indicate that the cost-saving rule outperform
the index rule by much in terms of the total amount of subsidy.
6 The Hybrid Mechanism
In the previous section, we showed that the UCB mechanism effectively prevents perpetual under-
estimation and achieves sublinear regret for general environments. However, the UCB mechanism
has one draw back: it assigns subsidies forever. Although the confidence interval Cg(n) shrinks as
n grows large, it does not degenerate to a singleton for any finite n. Accordingly, even for a large
n, there remains a gap between expected skill qˆi(n) and the UCB index q˜i(n) (though small in
size). This feature is not desirable for the following reasons. First, introducing a permanent policy
is often more politically difficult than introducing a temporary policy. If the government declares
that hiring of minority workers is permanently subsidized, the policy may look quite unfair to the
majority group. The appearance of unfairness would cause significant opposition. Second, if we
keep distributing subsidies over the long run, the required budget tends to grow. Third, besides
the subsidy itself, the permanent allocation of the subsidy comes with (unmodeled) administration
costs.
To overcome these limitations of the UCB mechanism, we propose the hybrid mechanism, which
starts with the UCB mechanism and turns to laissez-faire by terminating the subsidy at some point.
We terminate the UCB-phase once the amount of data of the minority group is enough to induce
spontaneous exploration. We prove that, our hybrid mechanism has O˜(
√
N) regret (as the UCB
mechanism does), and its expected total subsidy amount is O˜(1) (as opposed to O˜(
√
N) subsidy of
UCB).
The construction of the hybrid mechanism is as follows. Let sU-Ii (n) = q˜i(n)− qˆi(n) be the size
of confidence bound. Note that, sU-Ii (n) corresponds to the amount of the subsidy allocated by the
UCB index subsidy rule (Definition 5). The hybrid index q˜Hi is defined as
q˜Hi (n;h(n)) :=

q˜i(n;h(n)) if sU-Ii (n;h(n)) > aσx||θˆg(i)(n;h(n))||,
qˆi(n;h(n)) otherwise,
(6)
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where a ≥ 0 is the mechanism’s parameter.
The hybrid index is literally a “hybrid” of the predicted skill qˆi(n) and the UCB index q˜i(n).
If the difference between the UCB index and the predicted skill is larger than the threshold (i.e.,
sU-Ii (n) > aσx||θˆg(i)(n)||), the hybrid index is equal to the UCB index q˜i(n). The confidence bound
|q˜i(n) − qˆi(n)| is large while we have insufficient knowledge about group g(i); this is typically
the case in an early stage of the game. Once this gap becomes smaller than the threshold (i.e.,
sU-Ii (n) ≤ aσx||θˆg(i)(n)||), then the hybrid index becomes equal to the predicted skill qˆi(n).
Naturally, the hybrid decision rule is defined as the rule that hires the highest hybrid index.
Definition 8 (The Hybrid Decision Rule). The hybrid decision rule selects the worker who has
the highest hybrid index; i.e.,
ιH(n;h(n)) = arg max
i∈I(n)
q˜Hi (n;h(n)).
As the hybrid decision rule is a hybrid of the UCB decision rule and the laissez-faire decision
rule, it can be implemented by mixing the laissez-faire subsidy rule and either the UCB index
subsidy rule or the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule.
Definition 9 (The Hybrid Index Subsidy Rule). Let sU-Ii be the UCB index subsidy rule. The
hybrid index subsidy rule sH-I is defined by
sH-Ii (n;h(n)) :=

sU-Ii (n;h(n)) if sU-Ii (n;h(n)) > aσx||θˆg(i)(n;h(n))||,
0 otherwise.
Or, equivalently, the hybrid index subsidy rule can be defined by
sH-Ii (n;h(n)) = q˜
H
i (n;h(n))− qˆi(n;h(n)).
Definition 10 (The Hybrid Cost-Saving Subsidy Rule). Let sU-CSi be the UCB cost-saving subsidy
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Algorithm 5 The Hybrid Index Subsidy Rule
Complete the initial sampling phase by running Algorithm 1.
for n = N0 + 1, · · · , N do . The hybrid index subsidy rule starts.
for i do
Compute qˆi(n) = x′iθˆg(i)(n).
Compute q˜i(n) = maxθ¯∈Cg(n) x
′
iθ¯.
Compute sU-Ii (n) = q˜i(n)− qˆi(n).
Offer si(n) =
{
0 if sU-Ii ≤ aσx||θˆg(i)||,
sU-Ii (n) otherwise.
. The hybrid index subsidy.
Firm n hires ι(n) = arg maxi∈I(n)
{
qˆi(n) + s
U-I
i (n)
}
as an equilibrium consequence.
end for
end for
rule. The hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule sH-CS is defined by
sH-CSi (n;h(n)) :=

sU-CSi (n;h(n)) if sU-Ii (n;h(n)) > aσx||θˆg(i)(n;h(n))||,
0 otherwise.
Theorem 7 (The Properties of the Hybrid Subsidy Rules).
1. The hybrid index subsidy rule sH-I and the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule sH-CS implement
the hybrid decision rule ιH.
2. The hybrid index subsidy rule sH-I requires the minimum subsidy among all index subsidy
rules that implement ιH.
3. The hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule sH-CS requires the minimum subsidy among all subsidy
rules that implement ιH.
The proof of Theorem 7 is analogous to that of Theorems 5 and 6, and thus is omitted.
The algorithm of the hybrid index subsidy rule and its equilibrium consequence is stated as
Algorithm 5. As it is straightforward to modify Algorithm 5 to construct a hybrid cost-saving
subsidy rule, we omit the algorithm for the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule here.
The following two theorems characterize the regret and amount of subsidy of the hybrid decision
rule.
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Theorem 8 (Regret Bound for the Hybrid Decision Rule). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
Then, by choosing sufficiently small δ, the regret under the hybrid decision rule ιH is bounded as
E[RegH(N)] ≤ Chyb
√
N
where Chyb is a factor that is O˜(1) to N .
Theorem 9 (Subsidy Bound for the Hybrid Subsidy Rules). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
By choosing sufficiently small δ, for any a > 0, the total amount of the subsidy under the hybrid
index subsidy rule (SubH-I) and the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule (SubH-CS) is bounded as
SubH-CS(N) ≤ SubH-I(N) = Chyb-sub.
where Chyb-sub is a factor that is O˜(1) to N .
Proof. See Appendix B.7. The explicit form of Chyb is found at Eq. (54). The explicit form of
Chyb-sub is found at Eq. (61) therein.
Theorem 8 states that the order of the regret under the hybrid decision rule is O˜(
√
N), which
is the same as the original UCB decision rule. Theorem 9 states that the amount of the subsidy is
polylogarithmic to N , which is a substantial improvement from the standard UCB where O˜(
√
N)
subsidy is required.
The threshold of switching from the UCB mechanism to laissez-faire is crucial for guaranteeing
the performance of the hybrid mechanism. Our threshold, aσx||θˆ(n)||, is determined in such a way
that the hybrid decision rule ιH satisfies proportionality, which is a new concept established in this
paper. The formal statement appears in Lemma 28 in Appendix B.7 but it requires additional
notations that do not appear in the main body of this paper. In what follows, we provide a
high-level intuition regarding the concept of proportionality.
We evaluate the expected regret of the hybrid decision rule by comparing it with the expected
regret of the UCB decision rule. However, since different decision rules generate different histories
and data, neither decision rule dominates the other. This is why the comparison is challenging.
We overcome this problem by proving that the hybrid decision rule ιH is proportional to ιU in
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the sense that there exists a constant c > 0 such that when the UCB rule ιU hires worker i with
probability pi, then the hybrid rule ιH hires worker i with probability at least cpi given the same
history. This property guarantees that the hybrid rule escapes from underexploring the minority
group and secures expected regret of O˜(
√
N).
The timing of switching to laissez-faire is crucial for the proportionality. When the data about
the minority group are insufficient, firms rarely hire minority workers under laissez-faire. We
prove that, when the threshold is set to aσx||θˆg(n)||, then firms keep hiring minority workers with
sufficiently high frequency, and therefore, statistical discrimination is resolved eventually.
Remark 4 (Dependence on Parameter a). There is a tradeoff between the regret and subsidy.
The constant on the top of regret (Theorem 8) is exp(a2/4), which is increasing in a. By contrast,
the constant on the top of subsidy (Theorem 9) is exp(3a2/4)/a2, which goes to infinity as a→ 0.
Theorem 9 guarantees that the subsidy is O˜(1) whenever a > 0. However, when a is small, the
bound provided by Theorem 9 becomes large and may not be insightful. To balance the tradeoff,
the government should select a “right-size” value for a. In our simulations (Section 8) we adopt
a = 1.
For small a, because the hybrid mechanism is close to the UCB mechanism, we can divert our
analysis for the UCB mechanism (Theorem 5). When a is small and N is finite, the square-root
subsidy bound established in Theorem 5 may provide a tighter characterization of the total subsidy.
7 Interviews and the Rooney Rule
7.1 Two-Stage Model
Although the UCB-based subsidy rule is a powerful policy intervention to resolve statistical discrim-
ination, the subsidy rule is sometimes difficult to implement in practice. This section articulates
the advantages and disadvantage of the Rooney Rule, which requires each firm to invite at least one
candidate of each group to an on-site interview. The Rooney Rule is relatively easy to implement
because it requires neither the subsidy nor hard hiring quota.
To incorporate the additional information the firms acquire through the interview, we make
the following modification to the model. In the modified model, each round n consists of two
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stages. In the first stage, firm n observes the characteristics of each arriving agent i ∈ I(n), xi.
Based on xi, firm n selects a shortlist of finalists IF (n) ⊆ I(n), where |IF (n)| = KF for some
KF ∈ N. In the second stage, by interviewing finalists, firm n observes an additional signal ηi
for each finalist i (as assumed in Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2018). Firm n predicts each finalist i’s
skill from the characteristics xi and the additional signal ηi, and hires one worker from the set of
finalists, ι(n) ∈ IF (n). Firms are not allowed to hire a worker who was not selected as a finalist.
After the firm makes a decision, the skill of the hired worker yι(n) is publicly disclosed.
We assume the following linear relationship between the skill yi and the observable variables xi
and ιi:
yi = x
′
iθg(i) + ηi + i
The “noise” term comprises two variables: ηi and i. ηi is revealed as an additional signal when the
firm chooses i as a finalist. However, i remains to be unpredictable even after the hiring—firms
only observe yi after worker i is hired.
For analytical tractability, besides Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, we make the following two assump-
tions.
Assumption 4 (Two Finalists). Each firm can invite only two finalists; i.e., KF = 2.
Assumption 4 generates a minimal environment to consider the performance of the Rooney
Rule.
Assumption 5 (Normal Additional Signals). The signal that the finalist reveals is the independent
and identically distributed normal random variable:
ηi ∼ N (0, σ2η).
Remark 5. If ση = 0, then the two-stage model is the same as the one-stage model that we have
considered in the previous sections.
7.2 Failure of Laissez-Faire in the Two-Stage Model
This subsection analyzes the performance of laissez-faire in this two-stage setting. The result is
analogous to the one-stage case (Theorem 3) : laissez-faire often falls in perpetual underestimation,
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and therefore, has linear regret.
First, we formally define the regret. As in the one-stage model, the benchmark is the first-best
decision rule, which is the rule firms would take if the coefficient parameter θ were known. Clearly,
the first-best decision rule would greedily invite top-KF workers in terms of qi to the final interview.
We denote this set of finalists chosen by the first-best decision rule in round n by I¯F (n). Formally,
I¯F (n) is obtained by solving the following problem:
I¯F (n) = arg max
I′⊆I(n)
∑
i∈I′
qi s.t. |I ′| = KF .
After that, the first-best decision rule would observe the realization of ηi for i ∈ I¯F (n), and then
hires the worker i who has the highest skill predictor: qi+ηi. The unconstrained two-stage regret is
defined as the loss compared with this first-best decision rule. (This regret is named “unconstrained”
because we introduce an alternative definition of regret later.)
Definition 11 (Unconstrained Two-Stage Regret). In the two-stage hiring model, the uncon-
strained two-stage regret U2S-Reg of decision rule ι is defined as follows:
U2S-Reg(N) =
N∑
n=1
{
max
i∈I¯F (n)
(qi + ηi)−
(
qι(n) + ηι(n)
)}
.
Under laissez-faire, firm n’s optimal strategy is to greedily choose their candidates based on the
belief, i.e.,
IF (n) = arg max
I′⊆I(n)
∑
i∈I′
qˆi(n) s.t. |I ′| = KF .
After observing the realization of the additional signals ηi, firm n again selects the candidate with
the highest predicted skill:
ι(n) = arg max
i∈IF (n)
{qˆi(n) + ηi} .
Even in the two-stage model, laissez-faire has linear regret when the population ratio is imbal-
anced.
Theorem 10 (Failure of Laissez-Faire in the Two-Stage model). Suppose Assumptions 1, 3, 2,
4, and 5. Suppose also that K2 = 1 and d = 1. Let K1 − log2(K1 + 1) > log2N . Then, under
the laissez-faire decision rule, group 2 is perpetually underestimated with the probability at least
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Cimb = Θ˜(1). Accordingly, the expected regret of the laissez-faire decision rule is
E
[
U2S-RegLF
]
= Ω˜(N).
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
The proof idea of Theorem 10 is as follows. Under laissez-faire, each firm n interviews two
candidates who have the highest expected skills, qˆi(n). If both of these two workers are majorities,
then minority workers are never hired no matter what the ηi for each finalist is. By evaluating the
probability that both finalists are majorities, we derive the probability that perpetual underesti-
mation occurs. Note that, to meet K1 − log2(K1 + 1) ≥ log2N , K1 should be Ω(logN) = Ω˜(1).
Hence, Theorems 3 and 10 require the same rate of the imbalanced population ratio.
To summarize, even in a two-stage setting, the laissez-faire decision has linear regret (when the
population ratio is imbalanced). This is because the laissez-faire decision rule results in perpetual
underestimation with a significant probability.
7.3 The Rooney Rule and Exploration
As laissez fair does not perform well, we need to seek for desirable policy intervention. The Rooney
Rule, which requires each firm to invite at least one minority finalist to the final interview, is one
of the natural affirmative actions in this setting, and is widely implemented in real-world problems.
Definition 12 (The Rooney Rule). In the two stage hiring model, the Rooney Rule requires each
firm n to select at least one finalist from every group g ∈ G; i.e., for every n and every g ∈ G,
IF (n) must satisfy ∣∣{i ∈ IF (n) | g(i) = g}∣∣ ≥ 1. (7)
The Rooney Rule is relatively easy to implement because it imposes no hiring quota or hiring
preference given to minorities. The Rooney Rule of originally introduced as the National Football
League policy to promote hiring of ethnic-minority candidates for head coaching positions, but
variations of the Rooney Rule are now implemented in many industries.20 Although the Rooney
20For example, in a securities and exchange commission filing posted on 2018, Amazon declares that “The Amazon
Board of Directors has adopted a policy that the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee include a slate of
diverse candidates, including women and minorities, for all director openings. This policy formalizes a practice already
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Rule has been used in many places, its theoretical performance has not been studied intensively.
To understand the fact that the Rooney Rule resolves statistical discrimination, we introduce
an alternative (weaker) notion of regret, constrained two-stage regret.
Definition 13 (Constrained Two-Stage Regret). In the two-stage hiring model, the constrained
two-stage regret (C2S-Reg) of decision rule ι is defined as follows:
C2S-Reg(N) =
N∑
n=1
{
max
i∈I˘F (n)
(qi + ηi)−
(
qι(n) + ηι(n)
)}
.
where I˘F (n) is given by
I˘F (n) = arg max
I′⊆I(n)
∑
i∈I
qi (8)
s.t. |I ′| = KF ,
∀g ∈ G,
∣∣∣{i ∈ I˘F (n) | g(i) = g}∣∣∣ ≥ 1.
In plain words, I˘F (n) is the best list of finalists who satisfy the constraint (7). If (7) is imposed
as an “exogenous constraint” (rather than a policy), the first-best decision rule would interview
I˘F (n) to maximize social welfare. Clearly, the unconstrained regret is larger than the constrained
regret.
The constrained regret is useful in that it enables us to identify whether the Rooney Rule
prevents perpetual underestimation—if perpetual underestimation occurs under the Rooney Rule,
then the constrained regret is linear in N . To the contrary, if the social learning is successful (i.e.,
qˆi is very close to qi for all the workers), the constrained regret would be zero.
Under Rooney Rule, myopic firm n would greedily choose candidates based on estimator qˆi(n)
subject to the constraints:
IF (n) = arg max
I′⊆I(n)
∑
i∈I
qˆi(n) (9)
in place” (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312518162552/d588714ddefa14a.htm). In
addition, according to O’Brien (2018), Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg said that “The company’s ‘diverse slate
approach’ is a sort of ‘Rooney Rule,’ the National Football League policy that requires teams to consider minority
candidates.”
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s.t. |I ′| = KF ,
∀g ∈ G, ∣∣{i ∈ IF (n) | g(i) = g}∣∣ ≥ 1.
and ι = arg maxi∈IF (n) {qˆi(n) + ηi}. Note that the only difference between Eq. (8) and (9) is that
qi is replaced by qˆi(n).
The following theorem states that the Rooney Rule is able to resolve perpetual underestimation
with sufficiently revealing signal ηi.
Theorem 11 (Sublinear Constrained Regret under the Rooney Rule). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5. Then, the regret under the Rooney Rule is bounded as
E
[
C2S-RegRooney(N)
] ≤ C2SR√N
where C2SR is O˜(1) to N .
Proof. See Appendix B.9. The explicit form of C2SR is found at Eq. (68) therein. Note that C2SR is
exponentially dependent on signal variance ση (see the definition of C6 in Eq. (64)), which implies
that a sufficiently large value of ση is required to obtain a reasonable bound.
The proof idea is as follows. When a group is underrepresented, no candidates from the group is
regarded as the most promising finalist with a significant probability. Hence, laissez-faire may result
in perpetual underestimation. The Rooney Rule mitigates this problem by securing a finalist seat for
each group. If the additional signal is informative enough (i.e., ση is large), there is some probability
that the minority finalist beats the majority finalist and is hired. In other words, additional signal
naturally induces exploration for the minority group and prevents perpetual underestimation.
Remark 6. The Rooney Rule is analogous to the -greedy algorithm that is widely studied in the
multi-armed bandit and reinforcement learning literature. The -greedy algorithm usually makes
a decision based on the greedy algorithm (equivalent to laissez-faire in our model), but there is
a small probability () that the algorithm chooses a worker uniformly at random. In the bandit
literature, the - greedy algorithm is known to be robust to the choice of the exploration probability
: In fact, one can prove that the regret of the -greedy algorithm is sub-linear for any value  > 0.
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In our model, the Rooney Rule successfully resolve underexploration because of the randomness in
the additional signal ηi induces -experiments.
7.4 The Rooney Rule and Exploitation
This subsection shows that, although the Rooney Rule successfully prevents statistical discrimina-
tion, it may worsen social welfare evaluated by the original unconstrained regret.
When the population ratio is imbalanced (i.e., K1/K2 is large), there is a significant probability
that more than one majority worker has high skills. In that case, the true predicted skill of
the second-best majority worker (qi) is likely to be higher than that of the minority champion.
This feature raises constant regret per round: when ηi is normally distributed, any finalist has a
positive probability of being hired. Hence, the skills of all candidates matter, and therefore, firms
want to interview top-KF candidates who have the highest skills. The Rooney Rule prevents this
outcome. This effect would present even when firms had perfect information about coefficients θ.
Furthermore, the loss from the constraint (7) is constant per round, and therefore, results in the
unconstrained regret of Ω(N) in total.
Theorem 12 (Linear Unconstrained Regret under the Rooney Rule). Suppose Assumptions 1, 2,
3, 4, 5. Then, the regret under the Rooney Rule is bounded as
E
[
U2S-RegRooney(N)
]
= Ω(N).
The proof is straightforward from the argument above, and therefore, is omitted.
In summary, both laissez-faire and the Rooney Rule have linear unconstrained regret. However,
the structure behind these results are different. Laissez-faire has linear regret due to underexplo-
ration. In contrast, the Rooney Rule has linear regret due to underexploitation.
One way to resolve this trade-off is to mix the Rooney Rule and laissez-faire (as the hybrid
mechanism does). By starting with the Rooney Rule and abolishing it after sufficiently rich data
is obtained, we could mitigate the disadvantage of the Rooney Rule. In Section 8, we also testify
the performance of such a mechanism.
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Figure 1: The number of perpetual underestimation among 2000 runs under laissez-faire. The error
bars are the two-sigma binomial confidence intervals.
8 Simulation
8.1 Setting
This section reports the results of the simulations that we run to support our theoretical findings21.
Unless specified, the model parameters are set as follows: d = 1, µx = 3, σx = 2, σ = 2. The
regularizer of regression is set to be λ = 1. The group sizes are set to be (K1,K2) = (10, 2). The
initial sample size is N (0) = K1 +K2, and the sample size for each group is equal to its population
ratio: N (0)1 = K1, N
(0)
2 = K2. All the results are averaged over 2000 runs.
The value of δ in the confidence bound is set to 0.1.
8.2 The Effects of the Population Ratio
We first testify the population ratio effects to the frequency of perpetual underestimation (i.e.,
group 2 is never hired after the initial sampling phase). The decision rule is fixed to laissez-faire
(LF). We fix the number of minority candidates in each round to two (i.e., K2 = 2) and vary the
number of majority candidates (K1 = 2, 10, 30, 100).
Figure 1 exhibits the simulation result. Consistent with our theoretical analyses, we observe
that (i) as indicated by Theorem 2 laissez-faire rarely results in perpetual underestimation if the
population is balanced (i.e., K1 is close to K2 = 2), and (ii) as indicated by Theorem 3, perpetual
21The source code of the simulations is available at https://github.com/jkomiyama/FairSocialLearning/
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Figure 2: The comparison between the LF and UCB decision rules. The lines are the average
over sample paths, and the areas cover between 5% and 95% percentile of runs. The error bars at
N = 1000 are the two-sigma confidence intervals.
underestimation becomes more frequent as the population of majority workers increases (i.e., K1
increases).
8.3 Laissez-Faire vs The UCB Decision Rule
Figure 2a compares the number of minority workers hired by the laissez-faire (LF) and UCB
decision rules. Figure 2b compares the regret under these two rules. The horizontal axis represents
the round (where the number of total rounds is fixed to N = 1000), and the vertical axis represents
the number of minority workers hired and the regret, respectively. The subsidy required by the
UCB mechanism will be shown later (in Figure 4).
As indicated by Theorem 3, our simulation shows that laissez-faire has a significant probability
of underestimating the minority group. Consequently, we observe the following two facts. First,
the number of minority workers hired on average is lower than the first-best decision rule would
hire (hire a minority worker with probability K2/(K1 +K2) = 2/(10 + 2) ≈ 17% for each round).
Second, laissez-faire sometimes causes perpetual underestimation, and therefore, the number of
minority workers hired could be zero, and the regret grows linearly in n even after 1000 rounds.
Due to the possibility of perpetual underestimation, the confidence intervals of the sample paths
(denoted by the read area) is very large, indicating that the performance of laissez-faire is highly
uncertain.
In contrast, consistent with Theorem 4, the performance of the UCB decision rule is shown
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Figure 3: The comparison between the UCB and hybrid decision rules. The lines are average over
sample paths, and the areas cover between 5% and 95% percentile of runs. The error bars at
N = 1000 show the two-sigma confidence intervals of the expected regret.
to be much more stable. As the UCB rule avoids underexploration, it does not cause perpetual
underestimation. Consequently, (i) the UCB’s regret is lower than laissez-faire on average, and
(ii) the variance of the regret and the number of minority workers hired is also small. Note that
the UCB decision rule tends to hire more minority workers than the first-best decision rule. This
outcome happens because society is typically less knowledgeable about the minority group (due to
an uneven population ratio), and therefore, the confidence interval for minority workers is typically
larger than that for the minority.
8.4 The UCB Mechanism vs the Hybrid Mechanism
Next, we compare the performance of the UCB and hybrid mechanisms. The parameter of the
hybrid mechanism is set to be a = 1. Figure 3 compares the performance of these decision rules:
Figure 3a shows the number of minority workers hired, and Figure 3b shows the regret.
We observe that the number of the minority hired on average becomes closer to the first-best
decision rule (Figure 3a). Furthermore, as expected by Theorems 4 and 8, as for efficiency (regret),
the performance of these two decision rules grows in the same order. However, we find that the
hybrid decision rule outperforms UCB in our simulation setting (Figure 3b). We consider that
these results happen because the hybrid decision rule stops overexploration of the minority group
in an early stage.
Figure 4 compares the total budgets required by (i) the UCB index subsidy rule (UCB), (ii)
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Figure 4: The comparison of the budget required by subsidy rules. The lines are average over
sample paths, and the areas cover between 5% and 95% percentile of runs. The error bars at
N = 1000 show the two-sigma confidence intervals of the expected regret.
the hybrid index subsidy rule (Hybrid), (iii) the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule (CS-UCB), and (iv)
the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule (CS-Hybrid).
Figure 4a compares the index subsidy rules. As predicted by Theorems 5 and 9, the hybrid
index subsidy rule requires a much smaller budget than the UCB index subsidy rule. Furthermore,
the subsidy distributed by the UCB rule seems still growing, even after 1000 rounds are finished.
This is also consistent with our theory because the UCB rule requires O˜(
√
N) subsidy (while the
hybrid rule only requires O˜(1) subsidy).
Figure 4b compares the subsidy amount of the UCB cost-saving subsidy rule and the hybrid
subsidy rules. The UCB index subsidy rule is excluded because it requires a much larger subsidy
amount. We observe that (i) two cost-saving subsidy rules require a similar amount of the subsidy
(while the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule performs slightly better), and (ii) the cost-saving method
is very effective, even when it is compared with the hybrid index rule.
Note that, although the subsidy amounts required by these two cost-saving rules are similar,
when we have more rounds, the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule outperforms. Figure 5 articulates
this result. While the subsidy required by the hybrid cost-saving rule remains constant after a few
(about 100) rounds, the subsidy by the UCB cost-saving rule gradually grows. This result is also
consistent with our theory: While the subsidy required by the hybrid rule is O˜(1) (Theorem 9),
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Figure 5: The UCB cost-saving subsidy rule vs the hybrid index subsidy rule and the hybrid cost-
saving subsidy rule where N = 10000. Each line is an average over sample paths, and the areas
cover between 5% and 95% percentile of runs. Due to computational limitation, we only did 50
runs of this simulation. The error bars at N = 10000 show the two-sigma confidence intervals of
the expected regret.
the subsidy required by the UCB cost-saving rule is O˜(
√
N) (Theorem 6).
8.5 The Rooney Rule
This subsection describes the performance of the Rooney Rule compared with laissez-faire. Fig-
ure 6a depicts the relationship between the frequency of perpetual underestimation and the infor-
mativeness of the signal obtained at the second stage (measured by σ2η, which is the variance of ηi)
under laissez-faire and the Rooney Rule.
For the Rooney Rule, we observe that when the second-stage signal ηi is more informative, per-
petual underestimation occurs less often. This outcome happens because, even when the minority
finalist is underestimated (the predicted skill qˆi is small while the true skill qi is large), when σ2i is
large, the minority finalist has a significant probability of overturning the situation. If this happens
often enough, society can learn about the minority group, and statistical discrimination can be
spontaneously resolved.
As for laissez-faire, we observe that laissez-faire falls in perpetual underestimation with a signif-
icant probability for any ση adopted in the simulation. This outcome is consistent with our analysis
(Theorem 10). Since minority workers are rarely chosen as finalists, they have no opportunity to be
hired even when ση is large. These results imply that that, even in a two-stage model, laissez-faire
frequently results in statistical discrimination.
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Figure 6: The Rooney Rule’s performance for exploration.
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Figure 7: The unconstrained two-stage regret under laissez-faire (LF), the Rooney Rule, and their
hybrid (Rooney-LF).
Figure 6b shows the constrained regret of the Rooney Rule. We can observe that the constrained
regret grows sublinearly in n, implying that the Rooney Rule resolves perpetual underestimation.
Hence, under the Rooney Rule, society does not suffer from underexploration of the minority group.
However, this does not imply that the Rooney Rule arrives come without cost. As we discussed
in Subsection 7.4, once the coefficient parameter θ is learned, the Rooney Rule may prevent society
from making a fair and efficient decision. To testify this, we also examine the growth of uncon-
strained regret. Figure 7 exhibits the results of this simulation. We find that the performance
of the Rooney Rule is worse than laissez-faire because the cost of underexploitation (of Rooney)
exceeds the cost of underexploitation (of laissez-faire).
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As we indicated in Subsection 7.4, the performance of the Rooney Rule could be improved if
we terminate it after “learning is completed.” In this simulation, we also test this rule, the Rooney-
LF rule—impose the Rooney Rule to first 100 firms and then turn to laissez-faire. We find that
the Rooney-LF rule avoids perpetual underestimation, and therefore, has a similar performance to
laissez-faire. This result indicates that, if we select the transition timing appropriately, then we
can resolve statistical discrimination without compromising the quality of the finalists.
8.6 The Hybrid Mechanism vs Uniform Sampling
Kannan et al. (2018) show that when we have sufficiently large initial samples (i.e., N (0) is large),
the greedy algorithm (corresponding to laissez-faire in this paper) has sublinear regret.22 As stated
in Remark 2, our analysis also indicates that the probability of perpetual underestimation is small
when N (0) is large (see Lemma 24 for the full detail).
One may think that this “warm-start” version of laissez-faire is efficient. However, the warm-
start approach has several disadvantages. First, while we have ignored the cost of acquiring initial
samples thus far for analytical tractability, we need to take into account of the cost of acquiring
uniform samples if we want to take a sufficiently long warm-start period. As uniform sampling
ignores firms’ incentives for hiring workers, we need a large budget to implement it in practice.
Second, uniform sampling does not maximize any index. Accordingly, it cannot be implemented by
any index policy. Third, uniform sampling is inefficient in terms of information acquisition because
it is not adaptive to current estimated parameters.
We argue that our hybrid mechanism (Section 6) is a more sophisticated version of laissez-
faire with a warm start—it initially samples the data adaptively and then switch to laissez-faire
at an efficient timing. Hence, we can naturally expect that the hybrid mechanism outperforms
laissez-faire with initial uniform sampling.
Figure 8 exhibits the simulation results that compare the hybrid mechanism with laissez-faire
with various initial samples. In this simulation, the number of initial samples for each group is
proportional to the population ratio; i.e., N (0)g = (Kg/K) ·N (0).
Figure 8a measures the number of perpetual underestimations. As indicated by our theory,
22We also note that the number of initial samples required by the relevant theorem (nmin of Lemma 4.3
therein) is very large and cannot be satisfied in our simulation setting: Letting R = σx
√
2 log(N), we have
nmin ≥ 320R2 log(R2dK/δ)/λ0 ≥ 103.
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Figure 8: The comparison between the hybrid mechanism and uniform sampling. N0 (= N (0))
denotes the number of initial samples taken prior to laissez-faire. The error bars are the two-sigma
binomial confidence intervals.
the larger the initial sample, the less frequently perpetual underestimation occurs. In addition,
we observed no perpetual underestimation under the hybrid mechanism, as it solidly incentivizes
hiring from an underexplored group.
Figure 8b depicts the subsidy amount required by the cost-saving subsidy rules (recall that
uniform sampling cannot be acquired by any index subsidy rule). Here, we can observe that
the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule outperforms laissez-faire with uniform sampling. Laissez-faire
requires at least N (0) > 20 samples to mitigate perpetual underestimation. However, when N (0) ≥
20, the hybrid cost-saving subsidy rule requires a smaller budget than uniform sampling. This
result indicates that the hybrid mechanism is more efficient in compensating firms.
9 Contribution to the Multi-Armed Bandit Literature
Thus far, we have stated all the results in the terminology of the economics and statistical dis-
crimination literature. However, this paper also makes several technological contributions to the
literature of the contextual bandit problems, which are of independent interest. In particular, we
consider non-discounted reward formalization (Robbins, 1952; Lai and Robbins, 1985). Unlike other
formalization such as Gittins’s (1979) one (e.g., Sundaram, 2005; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2006),
this formalization weights future rewards and the current reward equally. The greedy and the
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UCB algorithms have been intensively studied in this literature, and we made several contributions
to it. For convenience of the readers, we state our technological contributions using the bandit
terminology.
Perpetual Underestimation The greedy algorithm (which takes optimal decision at each round
based on plug-in parameters) fails due to the randomness in finite samples. This concept originated
in a “context-less” bandit, a traditional model that corresponds to the limit of σx → 0. We prove
that, when the context is fixed (or has very small variance), exploration is required to mitigate
perpetual underestimation (Theorem 1).
Analysis of the Greedy Algorithm in a Disproportionate Model Some previous studies
(Bastani et al., 2020; Kannan et al., 2018) show that the greedy algorithm performs well if the
context variation is sufficient. Our results (Theorem 3) indicate that, when multiple arms form
a group (cluster) and share the coefficient parameter, the ratio of the group size is crucial for
the performance of the greedy algorithm (laissez-faire). This is a novel finding in the contextual
multi-armed bandit literature. When the contexts have limited variance, the greedy algorithm fails.
Development of the Hybrid Algorithm Thus far, the contextual bandit literature (e.g., Chu
et al., 2011) has studied the regret with an “adversarial” setup where the contexts (characteristics)
are chosen to maximize the regret, and the UCB algorithm was designed to solve such an adversarial
bandit problem.
By contrast, this paper assumes that the contexts are drawn from a fixed distribution. Our
hybrid algorithm, which switches from an UCB algorithm to a greedy algorithm, takes advantage of
the knowledge about the context distribution (more specifically, the information about σx), and se-
lects an appropriate time for switching. Consequently, we obtained the proportionality (Lemma 28),
which is a crucial lemma to evaluate the performance of the hybrid algorithm. As shown theoret-
ically (Theorem 9) and numerically (Subsection 8.6), the hybrid algorithm outperforms the UCB
algorithm in terms of the total budget required to a large extent.
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Analysis of the Rooney Rule To our knowledge, this is the first multi-armed bandit study
on the Rooney Rule.23 We show that, the greedy algorithm underexplores some arms even when
agents are unbiased and fully rational, and the Rooney Rule can mitigate that underexploration
(Theorem 11). The uncertainty in the first stage (the realization of ηi) helps to mitigate perpetual
underestimation by implicitly encouraging exploration.
10 Conclusion
We studied statistical discrimination using a contextual multi-armed bandit model. Our dynamic
model articulates that statistical discrimination can be caused by the failure of social learning. In
our model, the insufficiency of the data about the minority group is endogenously generated. The
lack of data prevents firms from estimating the candidate workers’ skill accurately. Consequently,
firms tend to prefer hiring a majority worker, which makes the data sufficiency persistent (perpetual
underestimation). In our setting, this form of statistical discrimination is not only unfair but also
inefficient. We showed that when the population ratio is imbalanced, laissez-faire tends to cause
this phenomenon.
We analyzed two possible policy interventions for mitigating statistical discrimination due to
the data insufficiency. One is the subsidy rules for incentivizing firms to hire minority workers.
We established the UCB and hybrid mechanisms and analyzed their performance theoretically and
numerically. Another policy is the Rooney Rule, which requires firms to interview at least one
minority candidate. Our result indicates that the Rooney Rule with an appropriate termination
would resolve statistical discrimination, while maintaining the level of social welfare. These results
contrast with to some of the previous studies (e.g., Coate and Loury, 1993; Moro and Norman, 2004)
that have shown that affirmative-action policies can be counterproductive.
Our analyses of the subsidy rules and the Rooney Rule provide a consistent practical policy
implication: Affirmative actions are useful for resolving statistical discrimination caused by the data
insufficiency, but they should be terminated once information acquisition is completed. If we start
with laissez-faire, firms may be reluctant to hire minority workers, and perpetual underestimation
could occur. Conversely, if we keep using an affirmative-action policy for a long period of time, the
23Prior to our work, Kleinberg and Raghavan (2018) study the Rooney Rule in the context of evaluation bias.
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policy may unfairly crowd out skilled majority workers. To summarize, a temporary affirmative
action would be the best solution to resolve statistical discrimination as a failure of social learning.
Appendix
A Lemmas
This section describes the technical lemmas that are used for deriving the theorems.
The Hoeffding inequality, which is one of the most well-known versions of concentration in-
equality, provides a high-probability bound of the sum of bounded independent random variables.
Lemma 13 (Hoeffding inequality). Let x1, x2, . . . , xn be i.i.d. random variables in [0, 1]. Let
x¯ = (1/n)
∑n
t=1 xt. Then,
Pr [x¯− E[x¯] ≥ k] ≤ e−2nk2
Pr [x¯− E[x¯] ≤ −k] ≤ e−2nk2
and taking union bound yields
Pr [|x¯− E[x¯]| ≥ k] ≤ 2e−2nk2 .
The following is a version of concentration inequality for a sum of squared normal variables.
Lemma 14 (Concentration Inequality for Chi-squared distribution). Let Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn be inde-
pendent standard normal variables. Then,
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
k=1
Z2k − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ t
]
≤ 2e−nt2/8
Lemma 15 (Normal Tail Bound, Feller, 1968). Let φ(x) := e−x
2/2√
2pi
be the probability density
function (pdf) of a standard normal random variable. Let Φc(x) =
∫∞
x φ(x
′)dx′. Then,
(
1
x
− 1
x3
)
e−x2/2√
2pi
≤ Φc(x) ≤ 1
x
e−x2/2√
2pi
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Lemma 16 (Largest Context, Theorem 1.14 in Rigollet, 2015). Let
xi ∼ N (µx, σxId)
for each i ∈ I(n). Let µx = ||µx|| and
L = L(δ) := µx + σx
√
2d(2 log(KN) + log(1/δ))
Then, with probability at least 1− δ, we have
∀i ∈ I(n), n ∈ [N ], ||xi||2 ≤ L(δ).
The following bounds the variance of a conditioned normal variable.
Lemma 17 (Conditioned Tail Deviation). Let x ∼ N (a, 1) be a scalar normal random variable
with its mean a ∈ R and unit variance. Then, for any b ∈ R, the following two inequalities hold.
Var(x|x ≥ b) ≥ 1
10
Proof of Lemma 17. Without loss of generality, we assume b = 0 because otherwise we can reparametrize
x′ = x − b ∼ N (a − b, 1). If a ≤ 0, the pdf of conditioned variable x|x ≥ 0 is 2ψ(x) for x ≥ 0.
Manual evaluation of this distribution24 reveals that Var(x) ≥ 1/10. Otherwise (a > 0), the pdf
of x|x ≥ b is p(x) ≥ ψ(x − a) for x ≥ a, which implies Var(x|x ≥ b) ≥ Var(z), where z be a
“half-normal” random variable25 with its cumulative distribution function
P (z) =

Φ(z) if z > 0
1/2 if z = 0
0 otherwise
.
Manual evaluation of Var(z) also shows that Var(z) ≥ 1/10.
24This distribution is called a folded normal distribution.
25Half of the mass lies in z > 0, the other half of mass is at z = 0.
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The following diversity condition that simplifies the original definition of (Kannan et al., 2018)
is used to lower-bound the expected minimum eigenvalue of V¯g.
Lemma 18 (Diversity of Multivariate Normal Distribution). The context x is λ0-diverse for λ0 ∈ R
if for any bˆ ∈ R, θˆ ∈ Rd
λmin
(
E
[
xx′|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
])
≥ λ0.
Let x ∼ N (µx, σxId). Then, the context x is λ0-diverse with λ0 = σ2x/10.
Proof of Lemma 18.
λmin
(
E
[
xx′|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
])
= min
v:||v||=1
E
[
(v′x)2|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
]
≥ min
v:||v||=1
Var
[
v′x|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
]
Let e1, e2, . . . , ed be the orthogonal bases. Without loss of generality, we assume θˆ = θ1e1 for some
θ1 ≥ 0 and µx = u1e1 + u2e2 for some u1, u2 ∈ N. Let
x = x1e1 + x2e2 + · · ·+ xded.
Due to the property of the normal distribution, each coordinate xl for l ∈ [d] are independent each
other. We will show the variance of
Var
[
xl|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
]
≥ σ2x/10, (10)
which suffices to prove Lemma 18.
• For the first dimension, we have x1 ∼ N (u1, σ2x) and
Var
[
x1|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
]
= Var
[
x1|x1 ≥ bˆ/θ1
]
.
Applying Lemma 17 with x = sgn(bˆ/θ1)/σx, a = µx/σx, b = |bˆ/θ1| yield Var
[
x1|x1 ≥ bˆ/θ1
]
≥
σ2x/10.
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• For the second dimension, we have x2 ∼ N (u2, σ2x) and
Var
[
x2|x′θˆ ≥ bˆ
]
= Var [x2] = σ
2
x > σ
2
x/10.
• (x3, x4, . . . , xd) ∼ N (0, σ2xId−2). In other words, these characteristics are normally distributed
and thus Var(xl) = σ2x > σ2x/10.
In summary, we have Eq. (10), which concludes the proof.
Lemma 19 (Martingale Inequality on Ridge Regression, Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011). Assume
that ||θg|| ≤ S. Take δ > 0 arbitrarily. With probability at least 1 − δ, the true parameter θg is
bounded as
∀n,
∥∥∥θˆg(n)− θg∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤ σ
√
2d log
(
det(V¯g(n))1/2 det(λI)−1/2
δ
)
+ λ1/2S. (11)
Moreover, let L = maxi,n ‖xi(n)‖2 and
βn(L, δ) = σ
√
d log
(
1 + nL2/λ
δ
)
+ λ1/2S.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ,
∀n,
∥∥∥θˆg(n)− θg∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤ βn(L, δ). (12)
The following lemma is used in deriving a regret bound.
Lemma 20 (Sum of Diminishing Contexts, Lemma 11 in Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011). Let λ ≥ 1
and L = maxn,i ‖xi(n)‖2. Then, the following inequality holds:
∑
n:ι(n)=g
∥∥xι(n)∥∥2(V¯g(n))−1 ≤ 2L2 log
(
det(V¯g(N))
det(λId)
)
for any group g.
The following inequality is used to bound the variation of the minimum eigenvalue of the sum
of characteristics (contexts).
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Lemma 21 (Matrix Azuma Inequality, Tropp, 2012). Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be adaptive sequence
of d × d symmetric matrices such that Ek−1Xk = 0 and X2k  A2k almost surely, where A  B
between two matrices denotes A−B is positive semidefinite. Let
σ2A :=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n∑
k
A2k
∥∥∥∥∥
where the matrix norm is defined by the largest eigenvalue. Then, for all t ≥ 0,
Pr
[
λmin
(∑
k
Xk
)
≤ t
]
≤ d exp(−t2/(8nσ2A)).
Proof. The proof directly follows from Theorem 7.1 and Remark 3.10 in Tropp (2012).
The following lemma states that the selection bias makes its variance slightly (O(1/ logK)
times) smaller than the original variance.
Lemma 22 (Variance of Maximum, Theorem 1.8 in Ding, Eldan, and Zhai, 2015). Let x1, . . . , xK ∈
R be i.i.d. samples from N (0, 1). Let Imax = arg maxi∈[K] xi. Then, there exists a distribution-
independent constant Cvarmax > 0 such that
Var[Imax] ≥ Cvarmax
log(K)
.
B Proofs
This section is structured as follows. Section B.1 describes the common inequalities that we assume
throughout the section.26 Proofs of individual theorems are shown in what follows.
B.1 Common Inequalities
In the proofs, we often ignore the events that happen with probability O(1/N). The expected
regret per round is at most maxi x′iθg(i) − mini x′iθg(i), which is O(1) in expectation. Hence, the
events that happen with probability O(1/N) contributes to the regret by O(1/N × N) = O(1),
26Except for Theorem 1 that does not pose distributional assumptions.
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which are insignificant in our analysis. In particular,
Pr
[
∀n ∈ [N ], i ∈ I(n), ||xi(n)||2 ≤ L
(
1
N
)]
≥ 1− 1
N
. (by Lemma 16) (13)
Moreover,
Pr
[
∀n ∈ [N ], g ∈ G,
∥∥∥θˆg(n)− θg∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤ βn
(
L,
1
N
)]
≥ 1− |G|
N
. (by Eq. (12) in Lemma 19)
(14)
and throughout the proof we ignore the case these events do not hold: All the contexts are
bounded by L(1/N) = O(
√
logN), and all the confidence bounds hold with βn
(
L(1/N), 1N
) ≤
βN
(
L(1/N), 1N
)
= O(
√
logN) = O˜(1), which grows very slowly as N grows large. We also denote
L = L(1/N) and βN = βN
(
L, 1N
)
.
We next discuss the upper confidence bounds.
Remark 7 (Bound for θ˜i). Let θ˜i = arg maxθ¯g(i)∈Cg(i)(n) x
′
iθ¯g(i). By definition of θ˜i, the following
inequality always holds:
∀n,
∥∥∥θ˜i − θˆg(i)(n)∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤ βN (15)
and Eq. (14) implies
∀n, xi(θ˜i − θg(i)(n)) ≥ 0. (16)
Moreover, by using triangular inequality, we have
∥∥∥θ˜i − θg(n)∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤
∥∥∥θ˜i − θˆg(n)∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
+
∥∥∥θˆg(n)− θ∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
and thus Eq. (14) implies
∀n,
∥∥∥θ˜i − θg(n)∥∥∥
V¯g(n)
≤ 2βN . (17)
We use the calligraphic font to denote events. For two events A,B, let Ac be a complementary
event and {A,B} := {A ∩ B}. We also use prime to denote event that is close to the original
event. For example, event A′ is different from event A but these two events are deeply linked.
Finally, we discuss the minimum eigenvalue. We denote A  B for two d × d matrices if A −B
is positive semidefinite: That is, λmin(A−B) ≥ 0. Note that λmin(A+B) ≥ λmin(A) + λmin(B)
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and λmin(A+B) ≥ λmin(A) if B  0. xx′  0 for any vector xRd.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an environment where there are two groups, G = {1, 2}, and two workers arrive in each
round, K1 = K2 = 1. We assume that error terms follow a standard normal distribution, i.e.,
σ2 = 1. We set the ridge regression parameter λ to be 1. We assume N
(0)
1 = 1 and N
(0)
2 = 0.
Hence, g1 = 1.27 We consider “no context” setting: Namely, d = 1, and xi = 1 for all i ∈ I.
We assume that θ1 = 0 and θ2 = −b with b > 0. Under this assumption, hiring a worker from
group 2 incurs regret of b. Let Rg(n) be the sum of the skills of workers who have been hired until
round n (i.e., have arrived from round 1 to n − 1) and belong to group g. Then, (2) implies that
θˆg(n) = Rg(n)/(Ng(n) + λ) = Rg(n)/(Ng(n) + 1). Since xi is fixed to 1, firm n chooses a group
whose predicted expected skill θˆg(n) is larger.
Since g1 = 1, firm 1 hires the group-1 worker: ι(1) = 1. Let b′ > b be a constant that we specify
later. Let
A := {θˆ1(2) < −b′} = {ι(1) < −2b′}
be the event that the skill of the worker hired in round 1 is smaller than 2b′/(1 + λ) = b′. The
probability that A occurs is Φ(−2b′), where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution of a standard
normal distribution. Let
B :=
N⋂
n=1
(
θˆ2(n) ≥ −b′
)
be the event that θˆ2(n) never becomes smaller than b′.
We evaluate the probability that A∩B occurs. When such an event happens, a group-1 worker
is hired in round 1, and group-2 workers are hired all the subsequent rounds (i.e., ι(2) = 2 for any
round n > 2). Accordingly, N2(n) = n− 2 is the case for all n ≥ 2.
{
θˆ2(n) ≥ −b′
}
=
{
R2(n)
N2(n) + 1
≥ −b′
}
⊇
{
R2(n)
N2(n)
≥ −b′
}
27Note that these the following derivation does not strongly depend on the specific value of these parameters nor
the number of groups.
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Applying Hoeffding’s inequality to the empirical average Rg(n)/Ng(n), we have
P
(
R2(n)
N2(n)
< −b′
)
≤ exp (−2(b′ − b)2(n− 2)) .
Accordingly,
P(B) ≥ P
(
N⋃
n=1
{
θˆ2(n) ≥ −b′
})
≥ 1−
N∑
n=3
exp
(−2(b′ − b)2(n− 2)) .
Here,
N∑
n=3
exp
(−2(b′ − b)2(n− 2)) ≤ ∞∑
n=3
exp
(−2(b′ − b)2(n− 2))
=
exp
(−2(b′ − b)2)
1− exp (−2(b′ − b)2)
≤ 1
2(b′ − b)2 ,
and thus P(B) occurs with constant probability 1− 1
2(b′−b)2 > 0 for any b
′ > b+ 1/
√
2. Remember
that A ∩ B implies that arm 1 is never drawn after n > 2, and thus Reg(N) ≥ bN . In conclusion,
we have
E[Reg(N)] ≥ Φ(−2b′) ·
(
1− 1
2(b′ − b)2
)
· b ·N = Ω(N),
as desired.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first bound regret per round reg(n) := Reg(n) − Reg(n − 1) in Lemma 23. Then, we prove
Theorem 2.
Lemma 23 (Regret per Round). Under the laissez-faire decision rule, the regret per round is
bounded as:
reg(n) ≤ 2 max
i∈I(n)
‖xi‖V¯ −1g
∥∥∥θg(i) − θˆg(i)∥∥∥
V¯g
.
Proof of Lemma 23. We denote the first-best decision rule by i∗(n) := arg maxi∈I(n) x′iθg(i). Then,
reg(n) = x′i∗θg(i∗) − x′ιθg(ι)
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≤ x′i∗
(
θˆg(i∗) + θg(i∗) − θˆg(i∗)
)
− x′ι
(
θˆg(ι) + θg(ι) − θˆg(ι)
)
≤ x′i∗
(
θg(i∗) − θˆg(i∗)
)
− x′ι
(
θg(ι) − θˆg(ι)
)
(by the greedy choice of firm)
≤ ‖xi∗‖V¯ −1
g(i∗)
∥∥∥θg(i∗) − θˆg(i∗)∥∥∥
V¯g(i∗)
+ ‖xι‖V¯ −1
g(ι)
∥∥∥θg(ι) − θˆg(ι)∥∥∥
V¯g(ι)
(by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality)
≤ 2 max
i∈I(n)
‖xi‖V¯ −1
g(i)
∥∥∥θg(i) − θˆg(i)∥∥∥
V¯g(i)
.
The following proves Theorem 2. For the ease of discussion, we assume N (0) = 0. That is,
there is no initial sampling phase. Taking it into consideration is trivial. We first show that
regardless of estimated values θˆ1, θˆ2, the candidate of group 2 is drawn with constant probability.
Let µx = ||µx||. Let
M1(n) =
{
x′1(n)θˆ1 ≤ 0
}
M2(n) =
{
x′2(n)θˆ2 > 0
}
The sign of x′1θˆ1(n) is solely determined by the component of x1(n) that is parallel to θˆ1(n). This
component is drawn from N (µx,‖, σx) where µx,‖ is the component of µx that is parallel to θˆ1(n).
Therefore, for any θˆ1, we have28
Pr[M1(n)] ≥ Φc(µx/σx). (18)
Likewise, for θˆ2 6= 0, we have29
Pr[M2(n)] ≥ Φc(µx/σx) (19)
Let X2(n) = {g(ι(n)) = g} for g ∈ {1, 2}. By using Eq. (18) and (19),
Pr[X2(n)] = Pr[x′1(n)θˆ1 < x′2(n)θˆ2]
≥ Pr[x′1(n)θˆ1 ≤ 0 < x′2(n)θˆ2]
28Pr[M(n)] = Φc(µx/σx) when µx,‖ = µx. Namely, the direction of µx is exactly the same as θˆ1.
29In the subsequent discussion, we do not care point mass θˆ2 = 0 of measure zero for N2(n) > 0.
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= Pr[M1(n),M2(n)]
≥ (Φc(µx/σx))2 . (20)
(by Eq. (18), (19))
LetN (M)2 (n) =
∑n
n′=1 1[M1(n′),X2(n′)] ≤ N2(n). Eq. (20) implies E[N (M)2 (n)] ≥ (Φc(µx/σx))2 n.
By using the Hoeffding inequality, with probability at least 1− 2/N2, we have
N
(M)
2 ≥ n
(
(Φc(µx/σx))
2 − k) (21)
for
k =
√
log(N)
n
.
Therefore, union bound over n = 1, 2, . . . , N implies Eq. (21) holds with probability at least 1 −∑
n 2/N
2 = 1− 2/N .
In the following we bound the λmin(V¯g). Note that a hiring of a worker i2 under events
M1(n),X2(n) satisfies a diversity condition (Lemma 18) with bˆ = 0, and we have
λmin(E[xιx′ι|M1(n),X2(n)]) ≥ λ0
with λ0 = σ2x/10. Using the matrix Azuma inequality (Lemma 21) for subsequence {xιx′ι :
M1(n),X2(n)} withX = xιx′ι−E[xιx′ι] and σA = 2L2, for t =
√
32N2σ2A log(dN), with probability
1− 1/N
λmin
 ∑
n:ι(n)=2
xιx
′
ι
 ≥ N (M)2 λ0 − t. (22)
In summary, with probability 1− 4/N , Eq. (21) and (22) hold, and then, we have
λmin(V¯2) ≥ N (M)2 λ0 −
√
32N2σ2A log(dN)
≥ (n(Φc(µx/σx))2 − k)λ0 −
√
32N2σ2A log(dN)
= n(Φc(µx/σx))
2λ0 − O˜(
√
n). (23)
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By using the symmetry of the two groups, exactly the same results as Eq. (23) holds for group 1.
In the following, we bound the regret as a function of ming λmin(V¯g). Eq. (23) holds with
probability 1 − O(1/N), and we ignore events of probability O(1/N) that does not affect the
analysis. The regret is bounded as
Reg(N) ≤ 2
∑
n
max
i
‖xi‖V¯ −1
g(i)
∥∥∥θg(i) − θˆg(i)∥∥∥
V¯g(i)
(by Lemma 23) (24)
≤ 2
∑
n
max
i
‖xi‖V¯ −1
g(i)
βN (by Eq. 14)
≤ 2
∑
n
max
i
||xi||
λmin(V¯g(i))
βN (by definition of eigenvalues)
≤ 2
∑
n
max
i
L
λmin(V¯g(i))
βN (by Eq. (13))
≤ 2L
∑
n
max
i
min
(
1
λmin(V¯g(i))
,
1
λ
)
βN (by λmin(V¯g(i)) ≥ λ)
≤ 2L
∑
n
min
(√
1
n(Φc(µx/σx))2λ0 − O˜(
√
n)
,
1
λ
)
βN (by Eq. (23))
≤ 4L
√
N
(Φc(µx/σx))2λ0
βN + O˜(1)(
by
N∑
n=C2+1
{
1√
n− C√n
}
= 2
√
N + O˜(1) for C = O˜(1))
)
which completes Proof of Theorem 2.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Since we consider d = 1 case in this theorem, we remove bold styles in scalar variables. In this
proof, we assume µxθ > 0 and θ > 0. The proof for the case of µxθ < 0 or θ < 0 is similar. Let
θˆg,t be the value of θˆg when group g candidate was chosen t times. With a slight abuse of notation,
we use i2 = i2(n) to denote the unique candidate of group 2 in each round n. We first define the
several events that characterize the perpetual underestimation. Namely,
P =
{∣∣∣θˆ
2,N
(0)
2
∣∣∣ < b
2
θ
}
P ′(n) =
{
xi2(n)θˆ2,N(0)2
<
1
2
µxθ
}
60
Q =
{
∀t ≥ N (0)1 , θˆ1,t ≥
1
2
θ
}
Q′(n) =
{
∃i s.t. g(i) = 1, xiθˆ1,N1(n) ≥
1
2
µxθ
}
where b is a small30 constant that we specify later. P and P ′ are about the minority whereas Q
and Q′ are about the majority: Intuitively, Event P states that θˆ2 is largely underestimated, and
P ′ states that the minority candidate is undervalued. Q states that the majority parameter θˆ1 is
consistently lower-bounded, and Q′ states the stability of the best candidate of the majority after
n rounds. Under laissez-faire,
N⋂
n=1
(P ′(n) ∩Q′(n))
implies the majority candidate is always chosen (g(ι) = 1 for all n), which is exactly the perpetual
underestimation of Definition 2. Therefore, proving
Pr
[
N⋂
n=1
(P ′(n) ∩Q′(n))
]
≥ O˜(1) (25)
concludes the proof. We bound these events by the following lemmas and finally derives Eq. (25).
Lemma 24.
Pr[P] ≥ C1b
for some constant C1.
Proof of Lemma 24. We denote xi2,t for representing t-th sample of group 2 during the initial
sampling phase, which is an i.i.d. sample from N (µx, σ2x). Likewise, we also denote yi2,t = xi2,tθ+t.
Pr[P] = Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑N(0)2
t=1 xi2,t(xi2,tθ + t)∑N(0)2
t=1 x
2
i2,t
+ λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ b2θ

= Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N
(0)
2∑
t=1
xi2,t(xi2,tθ + t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
b
2
θ
N
(0)
2∑
t=1
x2i2,t + λ


= Pr
−g(b) ≤ N
(0)
2∑
t=1
xi2,t(xi2,tθ + t) ≤ g(b)

30We will specify b = O(1/(logN)).
61
where
g(b) =
b
2
θ
N
(0)
2∑
t=1
x2i2,t + λ
 .
Let xi2,t = µx + et. Define an event R as follows.
R =

N
(0)
2∑
t=1
e2t ≤ 5σ2xN (0)2
 ⊆

N
(0)
2∑
t=1
x2i2,t ≤ 2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)

where we used x2i2,t = (µx + et)
2 ≤ 2(µ2x + e2t ) in the last transformation. By using Lemma 14, we
have
Pr[Rc] ≤ 1− 2e−2N(0)2 ≤ 1/4.
Moreover, let
S =

N
(0)
2∑
t=1
x2i2,t =
N
(0)
2∑
t=1
(µx + et)
2 ≥ N (0)2 µ2x
 .
It is easy to confirm that Pr[
∑
n(µx + et)
2 ≥ N (0)2 µ2x] ≥ 1/2, and thus
Pr[R∩ S] ≥ 1− 1/4− 1/2 = 1/4. (26)
Note that S implies
g(b) ≥ b
2
θN
(0)
2 µx + λ. (27)
Conditioned on xi2,t, we have xi2,tt ∼ N (0, x2i2,tσ2 ). Moreover, by using the property on the
sum of independent normal random variables,
∑
t
xi2,tt ∼ N (0,
∑
t
x2i2,tσ
2
 ) (28)
Letting
LR =
−g(b)−∑t x2i2,tθ
σ
√∑
t x
2
i2,t
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UR =
g(b)−∑t x2i2,tθ
σ
√∑
t x
2
i2,t
MR =
LR + UR
2
=
−
(√∑
t x
2
i2,t
)
θ
σ
We have
Pr
[
−g(b) ≤
∑
t=1
(x2i2,tθ + xi2,tn) ≤ g(b)
]
≥ Pr
[
−g(b) ≤
∑
t=1
(x2i2,tθ + xi2,tt) ≤ g(b),R,S
]
≥ Pr
[
−g(b)−
∑
t=1
x2i2,tθ ≤
∑
t=1
xi2,tt ≤ g(b)−
∑
t=1
x2i2,tθ,R,S
]
≥ Pr[R,S] min
{en:R,S}
[∫ UR
LR
φ(y)dy
]
(by Eq. (28))
≥ 1
4
min
{en:R,S}
[∫ UR
LR
φ(y)dy
]
(by Eq. (26)) (29)
The following bounds Eq. (29). The integral’s bandwidth is
UR − LR = 2g(b)
σ
√∑
t x
2
i2,t
≥ 2g(b)
σ
√
2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)
. (by event R)
The value of φ(y) within [MR − 1,MR + 1] is at least φ(MR)/e1/2 ≥ (1/2)φ(MR). Therefore,
∫ UR
LR
φ(y)dy ≥ min
2, 2g(b)
σ
√
2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)
× φ(MR)
2
. (30)
Moreover,
φ(MR) =
1√
2pi
exp
(
−(MR)
2
2
)
=
1√
2pi
exp
−θ2∑N(0)2t=1 x2i2,t
2σ2

≤ 1√
2pi
exp
(
−2θ
2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)
2σ2
)
(by event R) (31)
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By using these, we have
∫ UR
LR
φ(y)dy ≥ min
(
2,
2g(b)
σ
√
2(µ2x + 5σ
2
x)
)
φ (MR)
2
(by Eq. (30))
= min
1, g(b)
σ
√
2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)
φ(MR)
= O
(
b
√
N
(0)
2 exp
(
−2θ
2N
(0)
2 (µ
2
x + 5σ
2
x)
2σ2
))
(by Eq. (27), (31))
The exponent does not depend on b: Given all model parameters as constant, the probability of P
is O(b), which concludes the proof.
The following Lemma 25 on Q is about the stability of the mean estimator, which is widely
used to prove lower bounds in multi-armed bandit problems. Namely, for any ∆ > 0, a wide class
of mean estimators θˆ of θ satisfies
Pr
[ ∞⋃
n=1
(
θˆ(n) ≥ θ −∆
)]
≥ C (32)
for some constant C = C(θ,∆) > 0. Lemma 25 is a version Eq. (32) for our ridge estimator.
Lemma 25. There exists a constant N (0)1 that is independent on N such that, with a warm-start
of size N (0)1 ,
Pr[Q] ≥ C2
holds.
Proof of Lemma 25. In this proof, we use t ≥ 0 to denote the estimator where the t-th sample is
drawn. For example, V¯g,t := V¯g(n) of n : N1(n − 1) = t. Note that we consider d = 1 case and
V¯1,t =
∑t
t′=1 x
2
1,t + λ. By martingale bound (Eq. (11)), with probability 1− δ,
∀t ≥ 1, |θˆ1,t − θ|
√
V¯1,t ≤ σ
√√√√log( V¯ 1/21,t λ−1/2
δ
)
+ λ1/2S. (33)
64
Let δ = 1/2. It follows from
√
log x ≤ √x for any x > 0 that
√
log
(
2V¯
1/2
1,t λ
−1/2
)
≤
√
2V¯
1/2
1,t λ
−1/2. (34)
Therefore,
|θˆ1,t − θ| ≤
σ
√√√√log( V¯ 1/21,t λ−1/2
δ
)
+ λ1/2S√
V¯1,t
(by Eq. (33))
≤
σ
√
2V¯
1/2
1,t λ
−1/2 + λ1/2S√
V¯1,t
(by (34))
and thus
∀t ≥ N (0)1 , |θˆ1,t − θ| ≤
1
2
|θ|
holds if
√
V¯
1,N
(0)
1
≥ 2θmax
(
σ
√
2V¯
1/2
1,N
(0)
1
λ−1/2, λ1/2S
)
whose sufficient condition for the initial sample size N (0)1 is
V¯
1,N
(0)
1
≥ max
[
64
θ4
(σ4 /λ
2),
4
θ2
λS2
]
.
Note that Pr[V¯
1,N
(0)
1
≥ µ2xN (0)1 ] ≥ 1/2. Letting the observation noise σ and regularizer λ be
constants, constant size of warm-start is enough to assure this bound with probability C2 = 1/2×
1/2 = 1/4.
The following lemma states that, when θˆ2 is very small, the estimated quality xi2 θˆ2 of the
minority group is likely to be small.
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Lemma 26. There exists a constant C3, C4 that is independent of N such that
Pr[P ′(n)|P] ≥ 1− C3 exp (−C4/b) (35)
holds.
Proof of Lemma 26.
Pr[P ′(n)|P] ≥ 1− Pr
[
xi2(n) ≥
2
b
]
≥ 1− Φc
(
1
σx
(
2
b
− µx
))
≥ 1− 1√
2piσ2x
exp
(
− 1
σx
(
2
b
− µx
))
, (by Lemma 15)
where we have assumed
(
2
b − µ
)
/σx ≥ 1 in the last transformation (which holds for sufficiently
small b). Eq. (35) holds for C3 = 1√
2piσ2x
eµ/σx and C4 = 2/σx.
Lemma 27.
Pr[Q′(n) | Q] ≥ 1− (1/2)K1 .
Event Q′(n) states that all the candidates’ estimated quality xiθˆ is not below mean. Lemma 27
states that the probability of Q′(n) is exponentially small to the number of candidates. The proof
of Lemma 27 directly follows from the symmetry of normal distribution and independence of each
characteristic xi.
Proof of Theorem 3. By using Lemmas 24–27, we have
Pr[P] ≥ C1b (36)
Pr [Q] ≥ C2 (37)
Pr[P ′(n)|P] ≥ 1− C3 exp (−C4b) (38)
Pr[Q′(n)|Q] ≥ 1− (1/2)K1
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From these equations, the probability of perpetual underestimation is bounded as:
Pr
[⋃
n
{ι(n) = 1}
]
≥ Pr
[⋃
n
{P ′(n),Q′(n)},P,Q
]
≥ Pr [P] Pr [Q] Pr
[⋃
n
{P ′(n),Q′(n)} | P,Q
]
(by the independence of P and Q)
≥ C1b× C2 × (1−NC3 exp (−C4b))×
(
1−N
(
1
2
)K1)
(by the union bound) (39)
which, by letting b = O(1/ log(N)) and K1 > log2(N), is O˜ (1).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let reg(n) = Reg(n)− Reg(n− 1). Notice that under the UCB decision rule,
ι(n) = max
i∈I(n)
(x′iθ˜i(n)). (40)
By Lemma 19, with probability at least 1− δ, the true parameter of group g lies in Cg, and thus
x′iθ˜i(n) ≥ x′iθg (41)
for each i ∈ I(n).
Let i∗ = i∗(n) := arg maxi∈I(n) x′iθg(i) be the first-best worker, and g∗ = g(i∗) be the group i∗
belongs to. The regret in round n is bounded as
reg(n) = x′i∗θg∗ − x′ιθg(ι)
≤ x′i∗ θ˜i∗ − x′ιθg(ι) (by Eq. (41))
≤ x′ιθ˜ι − x′ιθg(ι) (by Eq. (40))
≤ ||x′ι||V¯ −1
g(ι)
∥∥∥θg(ι) − θ˜ι∥∥∥
V¯g(ι)
(by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality)
≤ ||x′ι||V¯ −1
g(ι)
βN . (by Eq. (14)) (42)
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The total regret is bounded as:
Reg(N) =
∑
n
reg(n) ≤
√
N
∑
n
reg(n)2 (by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality)
≤ 2βN
√
N
∑
n
||x′ι||2V¯ −1
g(ι)
(n)
≤ 2βN
√
2NL2
∑
g∈G
log(det(V¯g(N))) (by Lemma 20) (43)
≤ O˜(
√
N |G|)
where we have used the fact that log(det(V¯g)) = O(log(N)) = O˜(1).
B.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of the first statement Since si(n) = q˜i(n)− qˆi(n), we have qˆi(n) + si(n) = q˜i(n). Hence,
firm i’s incentive is aligned with the UCB index. Accordingly, firm i follows the UCB decision rule,
which maximizes the UCB index.
Proof of the second statement For notational simplicity, we drop n, Xg, Yg from this proof.
Define a correspondence U by
U(q˜i; s) := {ui ∈ R | ∃i,∃xi s.t. qˆi(xi) + si(xi) = ui, q˜i = q˜i(xi)} .
The set U(q˜i) represents the set of firm n’s all possible payoffs from a worker whose UCB index is
q˜i.
Clearly, the subsidy rule s implements the UCB decision rule ι if and only if for all i, q˜′i > q˜i
implies
minU(q˜′i; s) > maxU(q˜i; s). (44)
Since minU(·; si) is an increasing function, it is continuous at all but countably many points.
Equivalently, U(q˜i; si) is a singleton for almost all values of q˜i.
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Now, suppose that U(q˜∗i ) is not a singleton for some q˜∗i . Define ∆ by
∆ := maxU(q˜∗i ; s)−minU(q˜∗i ; s).
Define another subsidy rule s′ by setting
s′i(xi) =

si(xi) if q˜i(xi) < q˜∗i
minU(q˜∗i )− qˆi(xi) if q˜i(xi) = q˜∗i
si(xi)−∆ otherwise
for all i. Then, we have
U(q˜i; s′) =

U(q˜i; s) if q˜i < q˜∗i
{minU(q˜∗i ; s)} if q˜i = q˜∗i
U(q˜i; s)−∆ otherwise,
which implies U(·; s′) also satisfies (44), or equivalently, s′ also implements the UCB rule ι. Fur-
thermore, s′i(xi) ≤ s′i(xi) for all xi, with a strict inequality for some xi. Accordingly, s′ needs a
smaller budget than s.
By the argument above, whenever U(·; si) does not returns singleton for some q˜i, the subsidy
amount can be improved by filling a gap. From now, we discuss the case in which U(·; si) returns a
singleton for all q˜i; i.e., U reduces to a function. From now, we use u(q˜i; s) to represent the firm’s
utility when it hires a worker whose UCB index is q˜i (which was previously written as U because
it could take multiple values). Then, we have
si(xi) = u(q˜i(xi); s)− qˆi(xi)
for all xi. Since we require that si(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi,
u(q˜i(xi); s)− qˆi(xi) ≥ 0.
After some history, qˆi may become arbitrarily close to q˜i. Therefore, the inequality is satisfied for
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all q˜i and qˆi. Accordingly, u must satisfy
u(q; s) ≥ q (45)
for all q. The UCB index subsidy rule satisfies (45) with equalities for all q: The UCB index subsidy
rule satisfies si = q˜i − qˆi, and therefore, u(q˜i; s) = q˜i for all q˜i. Accordingly, it needs the minimum
possible budget.
Proof of the third statement We bound the amount of total subsidy Sub(N).
Sub(N) :=
∑
n
x′ι(n)(θ˜ι − θˆg(ι))
≤ ||x′ι||V¯ −1
g(ι)
βN , (by Eq. (15))
which is the same as Eq. (42) and thus the same bound as regret applies.
B.7 Proofs of Theorems 8 and 9
Proof of Theorem 8. We adopt “slot” notation for each group. Group g is allocated Kg slots and
at each round n, one candidate arrives for each slot. We use index i ∈ [K] to denote each slot:
Although xi at two different rounds n,n′ (= xi(n),xi(n′)) represent different candidates, they are
from the identical group g = g(i). In summary, we use index i to represent the i-th slot and with a
slight abuse of argument. We also call candidate i to represent the candidate of slot i. Note that
this does not change any part of the model, and the slot notation here is for the sake of analysis.
Under the hybrid decision rule, a firm at each round hires the candidate of the largest index.
Namely,
ι(n) = arg max
i∈I(n)
q˜Hi (n)
where q˜Hi is defined at Eq. (6). We also denote ι˜(n) = arg maxi∈I(n) x′iθ˜i. That is, ι˜ indicates the
candidate who would have been hired if we have used the standard UCB decision rule (Eq. (5))
The following bounds the regret into estimation errors of ι˜ and ι.
reg(n) = x′i∗θg∗ − x′ιθg(ι)
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≤ x′i∗ θ˜i∗ − x′ιθg(ι) (by Eq. (16))
≤ x′ι˜θ˜ι˜ − x′ιθg(ι) (by definition of ι˜)
= x′ι˜θ˜ι˜ − x′ιθ˜ι + x′ι(θ˜ι − θg(ι))
≤ x′ι˜(θ˜ι˜ − θˆg(ι˜)) + x′ι(θ˜ι − θg(ι)) (by definition of ι) (46)
Here,
x′ι˜(θ˜ι˜ − θˆg(ι˜)) ≤ ||x′ι˜||V¯ −1
g(ι˜)
∥∥∥θ˜ι˜ − θˆg(ι˜)∥∥∥
V¯g(ι˜)
(by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality)
≤ ||x′ι˜||V¯ −1
g(ι˜)
βN . (by Eq. (15))
≤ ||x
′
ι˜||√
λmin(V¯g(ι˜))
βN (by definition of eigenvalues)
≤ L√
λmin(V¯g(ι˜))
βN . (by Eq. (13)) (47)
Moreover, the estimation error of candidate ι is bounded as
x′ι(θ˜ι − θg(ι)) ≤ ||x′ι||V¯ −1
g(ι)
∥∥∥θ˜ι − θg(ι)∥∥∥
V¯g(ι)
(by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality)
≤ 2||x′ι||V¯ −1
g(ι)
βN . (by Eq. (17))
≤ 2||x
′
ι||√
λmin(V¯g(ι))
βN (by definition of eigenvalues)
≤ 2L√
λmin(V¯g(ι))
βN . (by Eq. (13)) (48)
Based on the above bounds, the regret is bounded as follows.
Reg(N) =
N∑
n=1
reg(n)
≤
N∑
n=1
 2√
λmin(V¯g(ι))
+
1√
λmin(V¯g(ι˜))
LβN
(by Eq.(46), (47), (48) )
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≤ 2LβN
∑
i∈[K]
N∑
n=1
1[ι = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
+ LβN
∑
i∈[K]
N∑
n=1
1[ι˜ = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
(49)
Eq. (49) consisted of two components. The first component is the estimation error of the hired
candidate ι. The second component is the estimation error of ι˜, who would have hired if we had
posed the UCB decision rule. The Hybrid decision rule ι˜ can be different from the UCB decision
rule ι, which is the main challenge of deriving regret bound in the hybrid decision rule.
We first define the following events
Vi(n) :=
{
xi(n)
′(θ˜i(n)− θˆg(i)(n)) ≤ aσx
∥∥∥θˆ(n)∥∥∥}
Wi(n) := {ι˜(n) = i}
Xi(n) := {ι(n) = i}
X ′i (n) :=
{
xi(n)
′θˆ(n) ≥ arg max
j 6=i
q˜Hj
}
⊆ Xi.
Event Vi states that the candidate i is not subsidized. Event Wi states that i would have been
hired if it was subsidized in the UCB decision rule. Event Xi states that i is hired and X ′i states
that i is hired regardless of the subsidy.
The following lemma is the crux of bounding the components in Eq. (49).
Lemma 28 (Proportionality). The following two inequalities hold.
Pr[X ′i ] ≥ exp(−a2/2) Pr[Wi] (50)
Pr[X ′i ] ≥ exp(−a2/2) Pr[Xi] (51)
Proof of Lemma 28. We first prove, for any c ∈ R, d > 0,
Pr
[
x′iθˆg(i) ≥ c
]
≥ exp(−d2/2) Pr
[
x′iθˆg(i) ≥ c− d
(
σx
∥∥∥θˆg(i)∥∥∥)2] . (52)
Let x‖ := (x′iθˆg(i))/||θˆg(i)|| be the projection of xi into the direction of θˆg(i). Then, x′iθˆg(i) =
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x‖||θˆg(i)||. From the symmetry of a normal distribution, x‖||θˆg(i)|| is drawn from a normal distri-
bution with its variance (σx||θˆg(i)||)2, from which Eq. (52) follows.
Eq. (50) follows by letting c = maxj 6=i q˜Hj , d = a because
Wi ⊆
{
x′iθˆg(i) ≥ c− d
(
σx
∥∥∥θˆg(i)∥∥∥)2}
X ′i ⊇
{
x′iθˆg(i) ≥ c
}
Eq. (51) also follows by letting c = maxj 6=i q˜Hj and d = a
Xi ⊆
{
x′iθ˜i ≥ c
}
X ′i ⊇
{
x′iθ˜i ≥ c+ d
(
σx
∥∥∥θˆg(i)∥∥∥)2}
and exactly the same discussion as Eq. (52) applies for31
Pr
[
x′iθ˜i ≥ c+ d
(
σx
∥∥∥θˆg(i)∥∥∥)2] ≥ exp(−d2/2) Pr [x′iθ˜i ≥ c] . (53)
Lemma 28 is intuitively understood as follows. Assume that candidate i would have been
hired under the UCB rule. The candidate may not be hired under the Hybrid rule because it can
cut subsidy for that candidate. However, there is constant probability such that a slightly better
(“aσ-good”) candidate appears on slot i and such a candidate is hired under the Hybrid rule.
The following two lemmas, which utilizes Lemma 28, bounds the two terms of Eq. (49).
Lemma 29.
E
 N∑
n=1
1[ι = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
 ≤ 2ea2/4
λ0
√
N +O(1).
Lemma 30.
E
 N∑
n=1
1[ι˜ = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
 ≤ 2ea2/4
λ0
√
N +O(1).
31Note that x′iθˆg(i) in Eq. (52) is replaced by x′iθ˜i in Eq. (53), which does not change the subsequent derivations
at all.
73
With Lemmas 29 and 30, the regret is bounded as
Reg(N) ≤ 2Lβn(L, 1/N)
∑
i∈[K]
N∑
n=1
1[ι = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
+ Lβn(L, 1/N)
∑
i∈[K]
N∑
n=1
1[ι˜ = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
(by Eq. (49))
≤ 6Lβn(L, 1/N)Ke
a2/4
√
N
λ0
+ O˜(1) (by Lemma 29 and 30) (54)
which completes the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof of Lemma 29. Let Ni(n) be the number of the rounds before n such that the worker of slot i
is selected. Let τt be the first round such that Ni(n) reaches t and Ni,t =
∑
n≤τt 1[X ′i (n)]. Lemma
28 implies E[Ni,t] ≥ e−a2/2t and applying the Hoeffding inequality on binary random variables
(1[X ′i (τ1)],1[X ′i (τ2)], . . . , ...,1[X ′i (τt)]) yields
Pr
[
Ni,t <
(
e−a
2/2t−
√
(logN)t
)]
≤ 2
N2
. (55)
By using this, we have
Pr
[
N⋂
t=1
{
Ni,t <
(
e−a
2/2t−
√
(logN)t
)}]
≤
∑
t
Pr
[
Ni,t <
(
e−a
2/2t−
√
(logN)t
)]
(by union bound)
≤
∑
t
2
N2
(by Eq. (55))
≤ 2
N
.
In the following, we focus on the case
Ni,t ≥ e−a2/2t−
√
(logN)t, (56)
which occurs with probability at least 1− 2/N .
Let V¯i(n) :=
∑
n′≤n 1[ι = i]xix
′
i  V¯g(i)(n). The context xi conditioned on event X ′i satisfies
74
assumptions in Lemma 18 with θˆ = θ˜i and bˆ = maxj 6=i q˜Hj . We have,
N∑
n=1
1[ι = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
≤
N∑
n=1
1[ι = i]
1√
λmin(V¯i)
(by V¯g(i)  V¯i)
≤
N∑
n=1
N∑
t=1
1[ι = i,Ni(n) = t]
1√
λmin(V¯i)
(by Ni(N) ≤ N)
≤
N∑
t=1
1√
λmin(V¯i(τt))
.
(by 1[ι = i,Ni(n) = t] occurs at most once)
In other words, lower-bounding λmin(V¯i(τt)) suffices the regret bound, which we demonstrate in the
following.
We have
E
[
λmin(V¯i(τt))
] ≥ λmin(∑
n
E[1[X ′i (n)]xix′i])
≥ λ0Ni,t. (by Lemma 18)
By using the matrix Azuma inequality (Lemma 21), with probability of at least 1− 1/N
λmin(V¯i(τt)) ≥
(
λ0Ni,t −
√
32Ni,tσ2A log(dN)
)
(57)
where σA = 2L2. By using Eq. (56), (57), we have
λmin(V¯i(τt)) ≥ λ0e−a2/2t−O(
√
t)
and thus
N∑
t=1
1√
λmin(V¯i(τt))
≤
N∑
t=1
1√
λ0e−a
2/2t−O(√t)
≤ 2e
a2/4
λ0
√
N +O(1).
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Proof of Lemma 30. Let NWii (n) =
∑
n′≤n 1[Wi] and let τt be the first round such that NWii (n)
reaches t and Ni,t =
∑
n≤τt 1[X ′i (n)]. The following discussions are very similar to the one of Lemma
29, which we write for the completeness. Then, we have
Pr
[
N⋂
t=1
{
Ni,t <
(
e−a
2/2t−
√
(logN)t
)}]
≤
∑
t
Pr
[
Ni,t <
(
e−a
2/2t−
√
(logN)t
)]
(by union bound)
≤
∑
t
2
N2
(by Lemma 28 and the Hoeffding inequality)
≤ 2
N
.
In the following, we focus on the case
Ni,t ≥ e−a2/2t−
√
(logN)t (58)
that occurs with probability at least 1− 2/N .
We have,
N∑
n=1
1[ι˜ = i]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
≤
N∑
n=1
1[ι˜ = i]
1√
λmin(V¯i)
(by V¯g(i)  V¯i)
≤
N∑
n=1
N∑
t=1
1[ι˜ = i,NWii (n) = t]
1√
λmin(V¯i)
≤
N∑
t=1
1√
λmin(V¯i(τt))
.
(by {ι˜ = i} increments NWii )
The following lower-bounds λmin(V¯i(τt)).
We have
E
[
λmin(V¯i(τt))
] ≥ λmin(∑
n
E[1
[X ′i (n)]xix′i]
)
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≥ λ0Ni,t. (by Lemma 18)
By using the matrix Azuma inequality (Lemma 21), at least 1− 1/N
λmin(V¯i(τt)) ≥
(
λ0Ni,t −
√
32Ni,tσ2A log(dN)
)
(59)
where σA = 2(L(1/N))2. By using Eq. (58), (59), we have
λmin(V¯i(τt)) ≥ λ0e−a2/2t−O(
√
t)
and thus
N∑
t=1
1√
λmin(V¯i(τt))
≤
N∑
t=1
1√
λ0e−a
2/2t−O(√t)
≤ 2e
a2/4
λ0
√
N +O(1).
Proof of Theorem 9. We here bound the amount of the subsidy. Eq. (47), (48) imply
x′i
(
θ˜i − θˆg(i)
)
≤ 1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
LβN
∣∣∣x′iθˆg(i) − θg(i)∣∣∣ ≤ 2 1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
LβN
and thus the subsidy sH-Ii (n) = 0 for
λmin(V¯g(i)) ≥
(
2LβN
‖θ‖
)2
max
(
1,
1
a2σ2x
)
=: Cs = O˜(1). (60)
Hence, it follows that
Sub(N) =
∑
n
sH-Iι (n)
77
≤
∑
n
∑
i
1[Xi]sH-Iι (n)
≤ LβN
∑
i
∑
n
1[λmin(V¯g(i)) ≤ Cs]
1√
λmin(V¯g(i))
(by Eq. (60))
≤ LβN
∑
i
∑
t
1[λ0e
−a2/2t−O(√t) ≤ Cs] 1√
λ0e−a
2/2t−O(√t)
(by the same discussion as Lemma 29)
≤ LβNK
∑
t
1[λ0e
−a2/2t ≤ Cs] 1√
λ0e−a
2/2t
+ O˜(1)
≤ LβNK 2e
a4/2
λ0
√
Csea
2/2
λ0
+ O˜(1) = O˜(1). (61)
Note that Cs diverges as a → +0. The bound of Theorem 9 is meaningful for a > 0. If a = 0,
the hybrid mechanism is reduced to the UCB mechanism, and thus Theorem 5 for UCB applies.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 10
We modify the proof of Theorem 3. Accordingly, we use the same notation as the proof of Theorem 3
unless we explicitly mention.
We define
Q′′(n) =
{
∃iA, iB s.t. g(iA) = g(iB) = 1, iA 6= iB, and xiθˆ1,N1(n) ≥
1
2
µxθ for i = iA, iB
}
.
When the event Q′′(n) occur, there are two majority workers whose predicted skill qˆi(n) is larger
than its mean.
Lemma 31.
Pr[Q′′(n)|Q] ≥ 1− (K1 + 1)
(
1
2
)K1
. (62)
Event Q′′(n) states that the second order statistics of {qˆi}i:g(i)=1 is below mean. Lemma 31
states that this event is exponentially unlikely to K1. By the symmetry of normal distribution and
independence of each characteristic xi, each candidate is likely to be below mean with probability
1/2, and the proof of Lemma 31 directly follows by counting the combinations such that at most
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one of the worker(s) are above mean.
When we have P ′(n) and Q′′(n) for all n, then for every round n, the top-2 workers in terms
of quality qˆi(n) are from the majority. In this case, the minority worker is not hired regardless of
additional signal ηi. Accordingly, this is a sufficient condition for a perpetual underestimation.
Proof of Theorem 10. By using Lemmas 24, 25, 26, and 31, we have (36), (37), (38), and (62).
From these equations, the probability of perpetual underestimation is bounded as:
Pr
[⋃
n
{ι(n) = 1}
]
≥ Pr
[⋃
n
{P ′(n),Q′′(n)},P,Q
]
≥ Pr [P] Pr [Q] Pr
[⋃
n
{P ′(n),Q′′(n)} | P,Q
]
(by the independence of P and Q)
≥ C1b× C2 × (1−NC3 exp (−C4b))×
(
1−N (K1 + 1)
(
1
2
)K1)
(by the union bound),
which, by letting b = O(1/ log(N)) and K1 + log2(K1 + 1) ≥ log2N , is O˜ (1).
B.9 Proof of Theorem 11
Proof of Theorem 11. We have
|x′i(θˆg − θg)| ≤ ||xi||V¯ −1g
∥∥∥θˆg − θg∥∥∥
V¯g
≤ L
λmin(V¯g)
βn (by Eq. (13) and (14))
≤ L
λ
βN (by V¯g  λId)
=: C5 = O˜(1). (63)
Let i1 and i2 be the finalists chosen from group 1 and 2, respectively. Define the following event:
J (n) = {ηi1(n)− ηi2(n) > 2C5}.
Under J , the finalist of group 1 is chosen because Eq. (63) implies that |x′i1 θˆg1 − x′i2 θˆg2 | ≤ 2C5
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and thus x′i1 θˆg1 + ηi1 − x′i2 θˆg2 + ηi2 > 0. Note that ηi1 − ηi2 is drawn from N (0, 2σ2η). Let
C6 = Φ
c(
√
2C5/ση). Then,
Pr[J (n)] = C6. (64)
Let NJ1 =
∑n−1
n′=1 1[g(ι) = 1,J ] ≤ N1(n) be the number of hiring of group 1 under event J . By
using the Hoeffding inequality, with probability 1− 1/N2 we have
NJ1 ≥ nC6 −
√
n log(N). (65)
By taking union bound, Eq. (65) holds for all n with probability 1 −∑n 1/N2 ≥ 1 − 1/N . From
now, we evaluate λmin
(
V¯1(n)
)
. It is easy to see that
V¯1 :=
n∑
n′=1:ι(n′)=g
xi1x
′
i1 + λI
≥
n∑
n′=1:ι(n′)=g
xi1x
′
i1
≥
n∑
n′=1:J
xi1x
′
i1 .
In the following, we lower-bound the quantity
λmin(E[xix′i|J ]) ≥ min
v:||v||=1
λmin(Var[v
′xi|J ]).
Note that i1 = arg maxi:g(i)=1 x′iθˆ1 is biased towards the direction of θˆ1, and we cannot use the
diversity condition (Lemma 18). Let v‖ and v⊥ be the component of v that is parallel to and perpen-
dicular to θˆ1.32 It is easy to confirm that Var[v′⊥xi] = ||v⊥||2σ2x because selection of arg maxi x′iθˆg
does not yield any bias in perpendicular direction. Regarding v‖, Lemma 22 characterize the
variance, which is slightly33 smaller than the original variance due to biased selection. Namely,
min
v:||v||=1
λmin(Var[v
′xi|J ]) ≥ σx
(
Cvarmax
log(K)
||v‖||2 + ||v⊥||2
)
≥ σxCvarmax
log(K)
.
32||v‖||2 + ||v⊥||2 = 1.
33O(1/ logK)
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By using the matrix Azuma inequality (Lemma 21) with σA = 2L2, for t =
√
32NJ1 σ2A log(dN),
with probability 1− 1/N
λmin(V¯1) ≥ σxCvarmax
log(K)
NJg − t. (66)
Combining Eq. (65) and (66), with probability at least 1− 2/N , we have
λmin(V¯1(n)) ≥ σx Cp
log(K)
n− O˜(√n) (67)
where Cp = C6Cvarmax = O˜(1). By symmetry, exactly the same bound as Eq. (67) holds for group
2. Finally, by using similar transformations as Eq. (24), the regret is bounded as
E[Reg(N)] ≤ 2
N∑
n=1
max
i∈[K]
∣∣∣x′i(n)(θˆg − θg)∣∣∣
≤ 2
N∑
n=1
L√
λmin(V¯g)
βN (by Eq. (13), (14))
≤ 2LβN
N∑
n=1
√
log(K)
σxCpn− O˜(
√
n)
(by Eq. (67))
≤ 4LβN
√
N log(K)
σxCp
+ O˜(1) = O˜(
√
N) (68)
which concludes the proof.
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